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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THESIS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As the microfinance industry comes of age, claims that microfinance providers need to 
improve their corporate governance structures and become more efficient have proliferated 
(CSFI, 2008). However, little scientific knowledge exists as to what constitutes effective 
corporate governance structures in the industry. This thesis thus responds to the need for more 
governance knowledge, especially for the microfinance industry. Specifically, the thesis sheds 
light on how different governance mechanisms, especially ownership, influence the 
performance of microfinance service providers.  
 
Microfinance is the supply of financial services to micro-enterprises and poor families 
(Robinson, 2001, Ledgerwood, 1999, Schreiner, 2002). The U.N. Year of Microcredit in 2005 
and the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank in 2006 have 
given considerable public recognition to microfinance as a development tool (Littlefield et al., 
2003, Claessens and Feijen, 2006). Recently, microfinance has also become an investment 
opportunity offering investors a new asset class for their portfolios (Reille and Foster, 2008). 
 
For the delivery of microfinance services, a new type of firm called a Micro Finance 
Institution (MFI)1 has come into being. A typical characteristic of an MFI is that it has a dual 
mission of serving the poor and being financially sustainable (Helms, 2006). Most MFIs are, 
or have been, sponsored by donors, and their ownership structure spans from member-based 
cooperatives to investor-owned firms.  
                                                 
1 This dissertation interchanges the terms Micro Finance Organization (MFO) and Micro Finance Institution 
(MFI) to refer to microfinance service providers. In this dissertation, there is no difference whatsoever between 
the two terms. The possible publication outlet has defined the term used in each paper.   
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 Outreach of microfinance services has grown tremendously during the last couple of decades. 
Christen et al. (2004) reports an astonishing 500 million people served, mostly with savings 
accounts, while the Microcredit Summit, in their 2006-meeting in Halifax, Canada, celebrated 
the milestone of 100 million borrowers reached. Nevertheless, microfinance still only reaches 
a fraction of the world’s poor (Robinson, 2001, Christen et al., 2004). Additionally, there is a 
special challenge related to reaching poorer segments and people living in less densely 
populated areas (Helms, 2006, Johnson et al., 2006). Altogether, there is a recognized supply 
challenge in the market, which indicates that there is a need for more knowledge about factors 
that influence the performance and outreach of microfinance suppliers. The intent of this 
dissertation is to fill part of this void by studying how different governance mechanisms 
influence the financial and social performance of MFIs.  
 
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of microfinance research. Section 3 positions the dissertation into relevant 
theoretical views. Section 4 discusses the relevance of the research. The extensive dataset 
constructed for the dissertation is presented in Section 5. The research questions and the major 
findings in the four research papers are outlined in Section 6, while Section 7 provides some 
additional robustness checks to test whether the statistical results presented in papers two and 
three yield satisfactory and confident results.  
 
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MICROFINANCE RESEARCH 
Scholars from a broad spectrum of research traditions have found interest in microfinance 
research. Mersland (2005) identified 130 peer reviewed articles published between January 
2002 and September 2004. The articles were found in thirty-nine different journals from a 
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wide variety of traditions and schools. Thirty-two of the journals had only one article related 
to microfinance. Approximately five of every six articles were in multi-disciplinary 
development journals or in one of the two specialized practitioner oriented journals, Small 
Enterprise Development & Microfinance and Journal of Microfinance. Less than one in ten 
articles was found in economics, finance, or business management journals, indicating that the 
development aspects of microfinance attract most interest from researchers. 
 
In particular, the impact from access to microfinance (overview in Claessens and Feijen 
(2006) and Littlefield et al.(2003), the building of inclusive financial sectors (overview in 
Helms (2006) and United Nations’ “Blue Book” (UN, 2006), aspects of group lending and 
group collateral (Besley and Coate, 1995, Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999, Paxton et al., 2000), 
and the development of microfinance theory (see (Aghion and Morduch, 2005) for overview) 
have motivated researchers. Additionally, the widespread tradition of informal savings and 
lending schemes, often referred to as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) 
(Ambec and Treich, 2007, Bouman, 1995, Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998, Besley et al., 
1993), has also attracted great interest from scholars.  
 
A schism that has stirred up considerable debate in the industry is the proposed long-term 
“win-win” logic between poverty outreach and organizational sustainability. The debaters 
argue whether improved organizational sustainability is what is needed to enable 
organizations to increase outreach to poor clients (Woller et al., 1999, Morduch, 2000, 
Schreiner, 2002, Rhyne, 1998). Linked to this debate is the study of the performance of 
microfinance organizations. Here, the Mixmarket and its Microbanking Bulletin 
(www.themix.org) have provided the industry with important knowledge and benchmarks. It 
is especially to this stream of research, the study of the performance of MFIs, that this 
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dissertation adds new knowledge by bringing in questions, theories and empirics on how the 
governance of MFIs influence their performance. 
 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The point of departure for the dissertation is that corporate governance, understood as the 
system or the set of mechanisms by which organizations are directed and controlled (OECD, 
1999), influences the performance of organizations. During the last three decades, the study of 
corporate governance has become a major area of research (Denis, 2001, Denis and 
McConnell, 2003, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Adams and Mehran (2003) report systematic 
differences between the governance of banking and manufacturing firms. This indicates that 
effective governance structures may be industry specific. Yet, except Hartarska (2005), little 
academic governance research is done in the microfinance industry (Mersland, 2005, Labie, 
2001). Most literature on corporate governance in the microfinance industry consists of 
consultancy reports and guidelines on how to structure boards and board procedures, and 
warnings against “weak governance structures” found in cooperatives and non-profit 
organizations (Campion and Frankiewicz, 1999, Council-of-microfinance-equity-funds, 2005, 
Rock et al., 1998, Otero and Chu, 2002, Jansson et al., 2004).  
 
Most research on corporate governance is rooted in agency theory, indicating that there are 
agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control (management) (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983). These costs can be minimized depending on 
the existence and practical implementation of corporate governance mechanisms. Thomsen 
(2008) lists a long list of mechanisms, all of which may serve to mitigate agency costs. 
Examples include boards, creditor monitoring, managerial incentive systems, product market 
competition, moral standards, and legal protection. Stakeholder theorists further widen the 
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approach, arguing that, not only do managers need to respond to owners’ interest, they also 
have to balance the need of several other stakeholders like employees, customers, local 
communities, and authorities (Freeman, 1984, Mitchell et al., 1997).   
 
The theory of ownership of enterprise framed by Hansmann (1996) takes into account both 
agency and stakeholder theories. It argues that different costs occur depending on who owns 
an enterprise. According to Hansmann, costs stem from market-based contracts between the 
enterprise and its stakeholders (for example, employees, customers and debt holders), and 
from the practice of ownership. The argument is that these costs can be minimized depending 
on who owns the enterprise.  
 
Because owners may have different incentives to control management, the study of ownership 
is important in corporate governance literature (Thomsen, 2008).  For the microfinance 
industry, this is particularly relevant because several ownership types coexist (Labie, 2001). 
For example, throughout the world, there are millions of informal savings and credit groups 
(ROSCAs) that have been initiated by the poor (Ambec and Treich, 2007, Bouman, 1995) or 
have been promoted by donors (Allen, 2006, Ashe, 2002). At the same time, public ownership 
of different types of rural, agriculture, development, and postal banks is common (Christen et 
al., 2004). However, this dissertation concentrates on formal private suppliers of 
microfinance. These are incorporated as non-profit organizations, member-based 
cooperatives, or shareholder firms owned by investors with different degrees of profit 
motivation (Isern et al., 2003). Cooperatives are, without a doubt, the dominant ownership 
form. India alone hosts more than 100,000 cooperatives  (Misra and Lee, 2007). In addition, 
non-profit organizations exist in the thousands (White and Campion, 2002), while only a few 
hundred shareholder firms exist. However, most cooperatives are very small and operate in 
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isolation, while most shareholder firms are relatively large compared to the average non-profit 
or cooperative MFI.  
 
Hansmann (1996) argues that the difference between ownership types lies in who controls the 
organization and who receives the profit from it. In a shareholder firm, the shareholders 
control the organization, decide on how to distribute the profits, and are free to sell their 
privileges. A non-profit organization might have several stakeholders influencing the 
organization. However, no particular group or person can claim ownership of it or receive 
residual earnings from it. A cooperative is controlled by its members, who are the only ones 
entitled to receive the proceeds from operations, whether through dividends or rebated prices 
on services. 
 
A review of several microfinance policy documents and relevant reports reveals that most 
outline the strengths of shareholder firms and the weaknesses of non-profit organizations and 
often the cooperatives (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, C-GAP, 2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 1998, Hardy et al., 2003, Jansson 
et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999). The implicit message is that a shareholder firm can perform 
better, in both outreach and financial performance, than a non-profit organization. This has 
resulted in a call in the industry for non-profit organizations to become shareholder firms 
(Fernando, 2004, Ledgerwood and White, 2006). But does the ownership type actually 
influence the MFI’s financial and social performance? This is one of the major questions that 
this dissertation aims to answer.  
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4. RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Researchers are increasingly being criticized for not studying issues relevant to practice 
(Tranfield, 2002). Ernø-Kjølhede et al. (2001) describes the demand for more relevance in 
research as “an increased articulation of societal expectation concerning the ability of public 
research to contribute to solving societal problems, wealth creation and other forms of 
utility” (Ernø-Kjølhede et al., 2001, p. 49). Furthermore, Gibbons (1994) calls for a 
knowledge production system denoted as “mode 2,” where there is a considerable level of 
interaction between science and society.  
 
To respond to the demand for more relevance in research, the research questions in this 
dissertation have been framed after active participation in the microfinance industry and in-
depth study of relevant policy documents that guide industry actors. In particular, papers 
issued by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (www.cgap.org), a World Bank-related 
donor consortium, have been studied. Moreover, at the outset of the dissertation, a study of 
130 peer reviewed articles related to microfinance was conducted (Mersland, 2005). The 
study revealed that, between January 2002 and September 2004, not one single study 
addressed questions related to corporate governance in MFIs. Hartarska’s (2005) paper on the 
governance of East European MFIs was in fact the only rigorous study available at the outset 
of this dissertation process. This stands in stark contrast to the importance given to corporate 
governance in the microfinance practitioner and policy maker communities. In a recent study, 
weak governance structures were considered to be the second most important risk factor in the 
industry (CSFI, 2008), and several policy guidelines have been issued on the subject 
(Campion and Frankiewicz, 1999, Council-of-microfinance-equity-funds, 2005, Rock et al., 
1998, Otero and Chu, 2002). We thus have a situation in which policy guidelines are issued 
without grounding in rigorous academic studies. For an industry claiming to be a major 
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contributor to fulfilment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (Littlefield et al., 2003), 
the lack of scientifically based knowledge is alarming. However, relevance alone is not a 
sufficient criterion for academic research. It is the interaction between theory and data that is 
the core of any scientific approach, including this dissertation.  
 
5. THE DATASET 
Hartarska (2005) and Morduch (1999), among others, highlight the need for better data for the 
study of microfinance questions. The construction of a new dataset has therefore been a major 
part of the dissertation. Until recently, data from Mixmarket (Microbanking Bulletin at 
www.themix.org) has been the main source of information for global microfinance empirical 
research. Thanks to new assessment reports produced by specialized microfinance rating 
agencies and co-funded by Ratingfund (www.ratingfund.org), a new source of information 
has become available.  
 
According to Ratingfund, MFIs benefit from rating and assessment in four ways. First, ratings 
and assessments increase financial transparency when it is made publicly accessible for all 
interested parties. Second, rating reports provide benchmarks against other MFIs and give 
management of different organizations the opportunity to compare their performance against 
peer organizations. Third, ratings make the organizations want to improve performance. 
Through in-depth analysis of the institution, management can point out areas that require 
more focus. Fourth, ratings and assessments give investors and donors the opportunity to 
compare and monitor standardised information on their investments. 
 
From a scientific point of view information from rating reports has at least four advantages 
compared to data from Mixmarket. First, raw data (the rating reports) are publically available 
 14
at www.ratingfund.org, Second, several more variables, especially variables relevant to the 
study of corporate governance, are available, Third, the data is not self-reported, as in 
Mixmarket, but collected and verified by a third party (the rating agency). Fourth, large MFI 
bias is avoided. Mixmarket data includes most of the very large MFIs. Several, but not all, of 
these are excluded in rating reports because they often do not demand specialized 
microfinance rating reports, but undergo traditional rating from agencies like Standard & 
Poor’s. The large firm bias is illustrated in Table 1. Mean differences between Mixmarket and 
Rating reports are considerable, but median differences are more similar. Taken together, the 
dataset built on rating reports is more representative of the overall universe of the thousands 
of MFIs.  
 
Table 1: Comparing data from Mixmarket and rating reports 
 
Mixmarket (2006) 
704 MFIs 
Rating reports 
290 MFIs 
4 years of 
observations 
Variables Mean median Mean Median 
Age 12 9 9 7 
Total assets 45,566,650 6,169,918 7,187,112 2,899,500 
Total staff 400 94 94 51 
Active loan clients 73564 10102 12543 4878 
Gross loan portfolio 33,072,688 4,438,677 4,585,764 2,112,000 
Average outstanding loan 1026 456 772 433 
 
Altogether, the dataset now covers 290 MFIs in sixty-one countries gathered by rating 
agencies between the years 2000 and 2007. The vast majority of the reports are from the last 
four years. The information stems from risk assessment reports made by five rating agencies: 
MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril. The reports range from ten to 
more than forty pages of narrative and accounting information, including benchmarks for up 
to four years. Methodologies applied by the rating agencies have been compared. No major 
difference in MFI assessment relevant to variables used in the dissertation has been found. 
When necessary, all entries in the dataset have been annualised and converted to US dollars 
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using official exchange rates. All five agencies are approved official rating agencies by the 
Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP) (www.ratingfund.org).  
 
With the help of Master of Business students and an experienced consultant in microfinance, 
up to 103 variables for up to four fiscal years have been extracted from the reports. The 
variables were selected based on a combination of theoretical interest and availability. Thus, 
the dataset includes information beyond the requirements of the dissertation, and will be used 
in several joint post-doctoral research efforts recently initiated.  
 
6. THE PAPERS 
Four research papers compose the dissertation. The papers and their specific research 
questions have materialised in a sequence similar to the way they are presented here. The 
strategy has been to expose the papers in several academic forums to secure relevant feedback 
and critique. All papers have been presented at two different research conferences, and have 
gone through important blind peer review processes to improve their quality and scholarly 
rigor. As a result, all papers are accepted for publication in peer reviewed journals. 
 
The first two papers are concerned with ownership and ask the question: “Do shareholder 
owned MFIs and non-profit MFIs differ, and if yes, how?” The first paper, “The Cost of 
Ownership in Microfinance Organizations,” forthcoming in World Development, expands 
Hansmann’s (1996) theory of ownership and illustrates that shareholder owned MFIs and 
non-profit MFIs do differ, and that each organizational type has its own benefits. It is 
therefore not obvious, as policy makers indicate, that shareholder owned MFIs will perform 
better than non-profit MFIs. The paper illustrates that non-profit MFIs (and cooperatives) can 
more effectively mitigate the costs of market contracts, and that such mitigation is highly 
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relevant because most MFIs operate in severely inefficient markets. However, the shareholder 
owned MFI can reduce the cost of ownership practice because owners have stronger 
incentives to monitor management. The paper concludes that the co-existence of different 
ownership types is probably what best serves microfinance customers. 
 
The second paper, “Performance and Trade-offs in Microfinance Organizations –  
Does Ownership Matter?”, published in Journal of International Development, empirically 
examines differences in performance between shareholder owned MFIs and non-profit MFIs 
and finds that the differences between the two ownership types are minimal in terms of both 
social and financial performance. The paper rejects the hypothesis that shareholder owned 
MFIs perform financially better than non-profit MFIs and rejects the hypothesis that non-
profit MFIs perform better socially than shareholder owned MFIs. The paper concludes that 
the policy guidelines calling for the transformation of non-profit MFIs to shareholder owned 
MFIs lack a well-grounded foundation. The paper also recommends the adaptation of a 
regulatory framework that allows strongly performing non-profit MFIs to become regulated 
and to be able to mobilize savings.  
 
Based on the finding that ownership does not influence MFI performance, paper three, 
“Performance and Governance in Microfinance Institutions,” forthcoming in Journal of 
Banking and Finance, asks the question: “What are the governance mechanisms that influence 
MFI performance?” The findings in this paper are that best practice governance mechanisms 
from regular firms in mature markets generally do not have much influence on the 
performance of MFIs. However, having a female CEO, local rather than international 
directors, and an internal auditor reporting directly to the board have a positive impact on the 
MFI’s financial performance. Additional findings are that CEO/Chairman duality increases 
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outreach, while individual lending has a negative impact on social performance. The paper 
concludes that a wholesale adoption of best practices in governance mechanisms from mature 
markets is probably counter-productive at this stage of the industry’s development. 
Traditional board oversight and public regulation do not seem to be core solutions to MFI 
governance. 
 
The findings in paper three motivate paper four, “The Governance of Non-Profit Micro 
Finance Institutions: Lessons from History,” forthcoming in Journal of Management and 
Governance, which asks: “If best practices governance mechanisms from regular firms do not 
have much influence on MFI performance, what are the governance mechanisms that have 
influence?” Paper four takes an original approach as it draws a parallel between historic 
savings banks and today’s non-profit MFIs. The paper illustrates the similarities between 
savings banks and non-profit MFIs and specifically outlines the non-profit ownership premise 
present in both types of organizations. The paper identifies the governance mechanisms that 
allowed savings banks to survive and prosper, and it analyses whether the practice of similar 
governance mechanisms could positively influence MFIs’ performance today. The conclusion 
of paper four is also a valid conclusion of the dissertation: “The findings could prompt a 
revision in the thought surrounding microfinance governance, which stresses for-profit 
ownership, regulation, and traditional vertical board control. The lessons from savings banks 
indicate that a broader and more stakeholder-based understanding of corporate governance 
is necessary. Stakeholders like depositors, donors, local communities, and bank associations 
can together provide a monitoring system that can enhance the long-term survival of MFIs. 
The findings also indicate that the need to transform ownership and limit regulation to for-
profit MFIs could be mitigated, and a pragmatic attitude toward financial objectives may 
improve the financial viability of the MFIs.”  
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 7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Of the four papers briefly outlined above and presented in full later in the dissertation, paper 
two “Performance and trade-offs in microfinance organizations – does ownership matter?” 
and paper three “Performance and governance in microfinance institutions” make use of 
statistics in analysing the research questions. In order to increase confidence in the statistical 
results presented in the two papers several robustness checks have been carried out and are 
properly reported in each of the papers. Journal reviewers have pointed to the robustness 
checks as strong points of the papers. It is however always possible to carry out additional 
tests. For example, the regression models can be modified by including or replacing 
independent or dependent variables, and specific tests can be applied to check whether the 
statistical methods employed are yielding satisfactory and confident results. Two guiding 
principles have helped define whether or not to include additional tests in the two papers. 
Firstly, the research model must be rooted in solid theory and whenever possible in previous 
empirical research. No estimation technique or regression model is perfect and no additional 
robustness check can replace the need for good theoretical basis of the research model. Good 
theory always comes first. Secondly, the regression results should be understandable and have 
some practical relevance (Hair et al., 2006). “Why” does the model yield its results? And, “So 
what”? Only when the statistical results are understandable and when some practical guidance 
can be derived does the research exercise become relevant.  
 
The fact that both of the mentioned papers are accepted in reputed peer reviewed academic 
journals should indicate that the papers are well rooted in theory and that they demonstrate 
practical relevance. Nevertheless, additional robustness checks can still be relevant. This can 
be either as a response to critique from other researchers or to serve as a motivation and 
 19
possible initiation of new research. To illustrate some possible additional robustness checks 
related to model specifications and statistical methods applied in papers two and three the 
following section is provided. 
 
Model specifications 
In paper two, that applies Schreiner’s (2002) framework in the search for performance 
differences between shareholder owned MFIs and non-profit MFIs, it could it be interesting to 
test whether there is a difference between the two ownership types when it comes to growth. 
Growth in number of credit clients can be accommodated within Schreiner’s framework as an 
alternative proxy for breadth of service outreach. Besides, rapid growth can also be 
interpreted as a risk factor. Thus, in order to test whether growth is a variable distinguishing 
between shareholder owned MFIs and non-profit MFIs, and still maintaining Schreiner’s 
(2002) performance framework, we can replace the total number of credit clients in table 5 in 
paper two (page 85 in this dissertation) with growth in credit clients. The alternative results 
for one year regression are presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Logit calculations of organisational predictions replacing total credit clients with 
growth in credit clients, Years 0 (the year of rating) when the binary variable ownership type 
contain shareholder owned MFI, coded as 0, and non-profit MFI, coded as 1 
 Year 0 Sign 
Debt level -.997 .325
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.653 .022
PaR 30  6.563 .166
ROE -.131 .892
Average loan amount  .017 .955
Growth in Credit clients  .917 .218
ROA 3.136 .399
Total voluntary savings  -.002 .018
Constant -.716 .555
Observations 143  
Classified correctly (%) 79,0  
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0,000  
Nagelkerke R Square 0,300  
 20
  
As illustrated in table 2 growth in credit clients does not significantly distinguish between 
shareholder owned MFIs and non-profit MFIs. Other coefficients and significant levels mirror 
earlier findings. This additional robustness check thus supports the findings presented in paper 
two that shareholder owned MFIs and non-profit MFIs don’t differ much when it comes to 
performance within the framework proposed by Schreiner (2002).  
 
It could also be interesting to study how growth influences the results in paper three where we 
study how different governance mechanisms influence the financial and social performance of 
the MFI. We could for example include asset growth as a variable controlling for risk in all 
regressions presented in tables 5 and 6 at pages 110 and 114 in this dissertation. By simply 
calculating yearly growth as Assetst / Assetst-1, we get a measure for growth. A disadvantage 
of this procedure is apparent as we loose one year’s observations. However, as illustrated in 
table 3 the model still yields satisfactory results.                                                   
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 Table 3: Estimation of performance measures using asset growth as additional risk metric 
 
 Dependent variables 
Variables ROA PY OSS OC Average 
loan 
Credit 
clients 
Constant -0.338* 0.010 0.000 1.089** -1.836 -93.881** 
CEO/chairman duality -0.020 0.054 -0.339** -0.105* -0.198 -0.831 
International directors -0.007 0.011 -0.090* 0.022 -0.074 -0.304 
Internal board auditor 0.009 -0.033 0.118 0.074* -0.108 -3.993 
Board size -0.004 -0.007 -0.034 0.013* -0.100** 2.293** 
SHF -0.019 -0.018 -0.190 0.008 -0.559 9.580** 
Female CEO 0.080** 0.077 0.195* -0.015 0.200 -2.947 
Individual loan 0.008 -0.108** -0.128 -0.083* 0.372 -9.151** 
Competition 0.014* 0.026* -0.011 0.015 -0.025 2.404** 
Bank regulation 0.011 0.000 0.123 -0.049 0.477 2.970 
Urban market -0.003 0.069 0.104 0.019 -0.099 5.601* 
MFI experience -0.001 0.000 -0.019** 0.003 -0.036** 0.088 
Portfolio at risk (30) -0.040 -0.104 0.624** -0.076 0.306 1.089 
Asset growth -0.003 0.014 -0.032 0.065** -0.093 -0.657 
Firm size 0.023** -0.004 0.138** -0.084 0.218** 6.212** 
Human dev. Index -0.094 0.413 -0.517 0.270 0.711 -21.410 
Wald F (sign.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exclusion test (sign.) 0.849 0.522 0.422 0.000 0.154 0.275 
Firm years 261 262 224 267 262 266 
The exclusion test is a test if asset growth can be excluded from the model.   
One star indicates a 10% significance level, two stars 5%. 
First of all, table 3 shows that firm years are reduced from between 303 to 355 in tables 5 and 
6 at pages 110 and 114 to between 224 to 267 when asset growth is included. Nevertheless, 
previous findings are generally mirrored in table 3. More important is the lack of statistically 
significance for asset growth in five out of the six regressions. The exclusion test tells us that 
in all regressions except operational costs asset growth does not improve the regression 
models. However, a counter-argument is that asset growth is simply added to the original 
regression. Instead it could replace either PaR30 or firm size, as it may be highly correlated 
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with these. However, background regressions (not reported) with either PaR30 or firm size 
left out, or both, turn out to be similar to the findings in table 3. The exclusion test still rejects 
the hypothesis that asset growth cannot be excluded in five of the six regressions. The lesson 
learned is that leaving out asset growth as a control variable in paper three was correct. 
However, future specific studies on MFI’s operational costs should include asset growth as an 
explanatory variable. 
 
Statistical methods 
The statistical methods applied in analysing research questions may influence the results. In 
what follows some additional tests will be presented to check whether the statistical methods 
applied in paper 3 are appropriate considering the theoretical interest of the paper and the 
information available in the dataset. 
 
The information available in the rating reports, the raw data forming up the dataset, is of such 
a nature that annual observations of several financial variables are available for up to four 
consecutive years, while MFI specific variables are normally available only for the year the 
rating took place. For example, if the report indicates that the MFI has five board members we 
have to assume that the MFI has had five board members during the whole panel period, 
normally four years. This goes for most of the governance variables that are of theoretical 
interest in paper 3 like for instance level of competition, lending methodology, female CEO 
and international board members. This is a limitation in the dataset that influences the choice 
of statistical methods. For example, the fixed effect panel data method cannot be applied since 
no meaningful average of annual observations can be calculated when they are all assumed to 
be the same value. Thus, if panel data is to be applied, estimation of coefficients must be 
made using the random effects method.  
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 It might however be that standard pooled OLS regressions yield satisfactory results even if the 
data has a panel structure. Hsiao (2003) proposes a test of the data to decide whether pooled 
OLS or panel methods should be applied. The test's null hypothesis is that individual means 
are common and thereby making it possible to use standard pooled OLS regression. The 
variation may be divided into individual (MFI), time (year of observation), and joint (MFI and 
year) effects. We can use this test to check for example the ROA regression in paper three as 
follows: 
 
(1) ROA = B1Duality + B2Int. directors + B3Board auditor + B4Board size + B5SHF +  
B6Female CEO + B7Individual loan + B8Competition + B9Bank regulation +  
B10Urban + B11MFI age + B12PaR30 + B13Firm size + B14HDI + Constant + u 
 
The result of the test is shown in table 4. 
Table 4: Analysis of variance for the real rate of return on assets as dependent variable in the 
pooled regression of (1) 
Source Sum of Squares Degrees Mean square F-Statistic Signif Level 
Individual 1.336 99 0.013 2.465 0.000 
Time 0.100 7 0.014 2.601 0.014 
Joint 1.414 106 0.013 2.436 0.000 
Error 0.871 159 0.005   
Total 2.285 265    
“Individual" refers to the variation pertaining to each MFI, “Time" is the variation caused by year, and “Joint" is variation 
induced by both MFI and year effects.  
The null hypothesis is that panel data effects are not present for each of the three effects. High F-statistic, and, therefore, low 
significance level rejects the hypothesis. 
 
The low significance levels indicate that we can reject the hypothesis that individual, time, 
and joint effects have common means. This indicates that we cannot estimate (1) efficiently 
using the OLS method. We obtain similar results for all dependent variables except 
operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and average loan. For these two dependent variables the 
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time effect is not significant. However, this does not invalidate the use of panel data methods 
for these variables, as the individual and joint effects are both significant. 
 
The random effects models applied in paper 3 can be studied further. First of all, (1) shows 
that we use a number of time invariant explanatory variables. In fixed effects estimation, all 
time invariant effects are washed out. However, we want to study these effects for reasons 
spelled out in the paper's theory section and, therefore, the fixed effects method cannot be 
used. The question is therefore whether the random effects model can be usefully employed. 
 
In paper three we use the 3SLS model. This involves first a GLS run and then another run 
using the GLS estimates as instruments. We may use a Hausman test for the model at two 
stages: (1) Is the GLS better suited than OLS? Thus, the coefficient values obtained with GLS 
is contrasted with those obtained with the OLS. (2) Is 3SLS better suited than GLS? 
 
The Hausman test (Greene, 2008) gives a measure of coefficient equality between two 
assumed models, and tests for their difference. The null hypothesis is that the two estimates 
do not differ systematically. The Hausman tests are presented in table 5. 
 
Table 5: The Hausman tests 
 OLS-GLS GLS-3SLS 
 2  Sign 2  Sign 
ROA 1051.221 0.000 52552.962 0.000 
OSS 78.881 0.000 38.270 0.000 
PY 449.191 0.000 6326.428 0.000 
OC 840.693 0.000 7161.855 0.000 
Average loan 5.520 0.977 28.898 0.000 
Credit clients 101.111 0.000 0.309 1.000 
 
The Hausman tests show rejection of coefficient equality in nearly all regressions of GLS 
against pooled OLS, and further 3SLS against GLS. For average loan and for credit clients as 
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dependent variable we find rejection in one case, but not the other. Overall, we use the same 
estimation procedure in all regressions for ease of comparison, and because the estimation 
procedure is clearly superior to pooled OLS estimation. 
 
Conclusion 
The additional robustness checks presented in this section illustrate how tests can be applied 
in order to check whether the research models and statistical methods applied in an analysis 
yield satisfactory and confident results. The additional tests presented in this section confirm 
the findings presented in papers two and three and increase the confidence in their results.    
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 ABSTRACT 
We compare the ownership-cost of Shareholders Firms (SHFs), Non Profit Organizations 
(NPOs), and Cooperatives (COOPs) involved in microfinance. A paradoxical situation 
motivates us: most providers, both historically and today, are NPOs or COOPs, while policy 
papers advocate SHFs. We lay out a theoretical framework to understand ownership costs in 
microfinance organizations better. We propose that cost variables related to market 
contracting favor NPOs and COOPs, whereas most cost variables related to the practice of 
ownership favor SHFs. We conclude that what best serves the customers is the coexistence of 
ownership types and call for empirical research to test this theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance is the supply of banking services to micro-enterprises and poor families. Private 
suppliers of microfinance are normally incorporated as member-based Cooperatives 
(COOPs), Non Profit Organizations (NPOs), or Shareholder Firms (SHFs). This paper 
compares the costs of these three ownership types. A paradoxical situation motivates us: 
While policy makers normally advocate SHFs, most suppliers of microfinance are NPOs or 
COOPs. Compared to a few hundred SHFs, there are thousands of NPOs and India alone has 
more than a hundred thousand COOPs (Misra and Lee, 2007). To understand ownership costs 
in Microfinance Organizations (MFOs) better, we lay out a theoretical driven framework and 
use it to compare the costs of the different types of MFOs. 
 
The UN Year of Microcredit in 2005 and the Nobel Peace Prize given to Mohammad Yunus 
and Grameen Bank in 2006 have given considerable public recognition to microfinance as a 
development tool. Christen et al. (2004) report an astonishing 500 million persons served, 
mostly with savings accounts, while the Microcredit Summit’s 2006 meeting in Halifax 
celebrated the milestone of 100 million borrowers. Nevertheless, microfinance still only 
reaches a fraction of the world’s poor (Christen et al., 2004, Robinson, 2001). Thus, there is a 
recognized supply challenge in the market (Helms, 2006).  
 
Other studies analyzing microfinance supply have compared the welfare approach and the 
sustainability approach: the first measures success by how well it fulfills the short-term needs 
of the poorest people; while the second proposes a long-term, “win-win” logic between 
poverty outreach and organizational sustainability (Woller et al., 1999, Morduch, 2000, 
Rhyne, 1998). This conceptual study complements existing research as it claims to be the first 
to present a systematic framework that explains the intrinsic ownership-cost differences 
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between the most common types of suppliers in the microfinance industry. Proper use of the 
framework could help direct future empirical work and policy guidelines on MFO ownership 
 
To develop the framework, we apply Hansmann’s (1996) economic theory of ownership, 
which identifies several variables influencing the cost of ownership. We relate each of these 
variables to the microfinance industry and analytically compare the ownership cost of SHFs, 
NPOs, and COOPs. To illustrate and support our analysis, we outline several examples and 
share descriptive global statistics from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks (www.themix.org). The 
effect of each cost-variable is isolated and finalized with a proposition which indicates 
whether the ownership costs in NPOs and COOPs are, on average, higher or lower than for 
SHFs. Based on an extension of Hansmann’s theory, we propose that cost-variables related to 
market contracts favor NPOs and COOPs, whereas most of the cost-variables related to the 
practice of ownership favor SHFs. The apparent lower costs of ownership-practice in SHFs 
provide strong support for this ownership type. However, our analysis also indicates that 
NPOs and COOPs can more effectively mitigate the costs of market contracts, and that such 
mitigation is highly relevant since most MFOs operate in severely inefficient markets. Thus, 
the theory does not support policy makers’ preferences for investor ownership. A mixture of 
different ownership types, similar to that found in mature banking markets, would probably 
best serve microfinance customers.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section two lays out ownership policies and 
empirics; while section three explains the theory and the methodology applied, followed by 
sections four and five, in which the cost variables for market contracts and the practice of 
ownership are analyzed. Section six presents a table summarizing the discussions of the 
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former sections. Section seven concludes the paper and provides implications for policy 
makers and researchers.  
 
2. OWNERSHIP POLICIES AND EMPIRICS IN THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY 
Policy papers generally advocate SHFs as the most appropriate ownership type for the 
microfinance market (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, C-GAP, 2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 1998, Hardy et al., 2003, Jansson 
et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999). The arguments used are that SHFs can be regulated by banking 
authorities, accept deposits, provide a larger range of better quality services, be independent 
from donors, attract private equity capital, and benefit from superior corporate governance 
because they are privately owned. Some of these arguments relate to a situation where 
national legal frameworks consider NPOs and most COOPs as inferior banking organizations. 
Few NPOs are regulated and allowed to mobilize savings, and the supervision of most COOPs 
is generally considered outside the scope of banking authorities (C-GAP, 2003).   
 
One consequence of current policies has been a “call” for NPOs to transform into SHFs 
(White and Campion, 2002, Fernando, 2004, Rhyne, 2001). Accounts of successful 
transformations have been shared (Fernando, 2004), and guidelines on how to transform have 
been published (Ledgerwood and White, 2006, White and Campion, 2002). Between 1992 
and 2006, about 43 NPOs were transformed into shareholder organizations (Fernando, 2004, 
Hishigsuren, 2006). In most cases, the original NPO continued as a major owner in the new 
SHF (White and Campion, 2002, Ledgerwood and White, 2006). Transformed SHFs have 
generally been able to increase their outreach considerably (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). 
However, some observers fear that increased outreach doesn’t come without cost and warn 
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about a possible “mission drift” (Woller, 2002). Christen (2001), however, does not give 
credit to these fears.  
 
Empirical studies of the ownership effects on the dual microfinance objectives of outreach 
and sustainability are scarce. Exceptions are Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) who on a 
global dataset of rated MFOs found that the differences between NPOs and SHFs was 
minimal on both outreach and sustainability dimensions, similar to what Hartarska (2005) 
found in her study on corporate governance in East European MFOs. However, Gutierrez-
Nieto et al. (2007) did find that NPOs are more efficient in making a large number of loans 
while operating as cheaply as possible when compared to non-NPOs.  
 
Historically, pro-poor banking has been dominated by COOPs and NPOs, such as the 17th 
century philanthropic English loan funds (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998), the 18th century Irish 
loan funds (Hollis and Sweetman, 2004), the 19th century savings banks (Teck, 1968), and 
the 19th century Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen cooperatives (Teck, 1968). The 
cooperatives and savings banks still continue to flourish in several highly competitive markets 
(Christen et al., 2004, Peachey and Roe, 2006). In mature bank-markets, where different 
ownership types coexist, researchers find little evidence to suggest that SHFs are more 
efficient than the COOPs or NPOs (Altunbas et al., 2001, Crespi et al., 2004, ESBG, 2004).  
 
The global statistics from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks (www.themix.org) provide self-reported 
data from 704 MFOs. Five charter types are represented: Banks, Credit Unions, Non Bank 
Financial Institutions (NBFIs), NGOs, and Rural Banks. Banks and Rural Banks can have 
different types of ownership and be both privately and publicly owned. However, the Credit 
Unions are similar to the COOPs, the NGOs are similar to the NPOs, and the NBFIs are 
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similar to the SHFs. In table one, descriptive statistics for the three ownership types are 
displayed.  
 
Table 1: Selected benchmarks for MFOs according to their type of ownership 
Indicators: SHFs COOPs NPOs 
Number of MFOs 230 74 282 
 Median Median Median 
Age of MFO (years) 8 10 10 
Total assets (US$) 8 124 068 6 500 227 3 757 662 
Number of active borrowers 11 007 4 852 10 947 
Gross loan portfolio (US$) 6 395 958 5 401 213 2 834 596 
Average loan balance per borrower (US$) 562 1408 227 
Percentage of women reached 55% 51,9% 82,1% 
Return on Assets (ROA) 1,5% 0,3% 0,2% 
Portfolio at risk > 30 days 2,2% 4,2% 2,6% 
Write-off ratio 0,9% 2,0% 1,0% 
Operating expense/Loan portfolio 20,8% 14,0% 27,7% 
Cost per loan (US$) 144 156 70 
 
The smallest COOP in the dataset has more than three hundred thousand dollars in assets, and 
thus the COOPs represented are clearly not the average small COOP involved in 
microfinance. Few of these smaller COOPs are in a position to self report their data to the 
MIX. However, the data illustrates that MFOs differ according to their type of ownership. 
Generally speaking, NPOs are smaller in assets, but not in customers, when compared to 
SHFs. NPOs’ average loan balance is considerably lower than that for SHFs. Similarly, NPOs 
serve more female customers. Measured as Return on Assets, SHFs have higher profits, while 
risk profiles are fairly even with the NPOs. Lower operating expenses in SHFs seem to be 
related to higher average loans, since the cost per loan in NPOs is actually half that of SHFs. 
 
3. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
Like Hansmann (1996), we do not advocate any particular type of ownership. Instead, we 
search for non-legal (La-Porta et al., 1998) and non-historic (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) 
variables which influence the cost of ownership. SHFs are firms limited by shares like banks 
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and non-bank financial institutions, and owned by investors whether they are profit seeking or 
social investors, individuals or organizations. COOPs are customer owned organizations like 
credit unions, building societies, savings and credit cooperatives, etc. NPOs are organizations 
without any legal owners. We recognize that organizational objectives are not necessarily 
uniform within the same ownership type. However, we follow Hansmann’s logical reasoning 
that the intrinsic differences between SHFs, COOPs, and NPOs lie in who controls the 
organization and who receives the profit from it. In an SHF, the shareholders control the 
organization, decide on how to distribute the profits, and are free to sell their privileges. In a 
COOP, the ultimate control is in the hands of its members who, through their voting rights, 
can decide on policy issues. The members are also the only ones entitled to receive proceeds 
from the operations either through dividends or rebated prices on services. An NPO may have 
several stakeholders influencing the organization. However, no particular group or person can 
legally claim ownership of it or receive residual earnings from it. 
 
We view the firm as a nexus of contracts between different patrons and the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In MFOs the main patrons are employees, credit customers, savings 
customers, debt holders, equity holders, and donors.1 There are two possible relationships 
between the firm and the patrons: in the first, the patron deals with the firm through market 
contracts; while in the second, the patron can also be the owner of the firm. Both of these 
relationships involve costs and, by analyzing these, ownership types can be better understood 
and compared.   
 
                                                 
1 Service providers including rating agencies, networks, auditors, credit bureaus, providers of 
technical assistance, etc. are also important patrons of MFOs. However, they are considered 
outside the scope of this article. 
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Market contracts are not costless. Market failures, like an absence of effective competition 
and substantial informational disadvantages, prevail in the microfinance industry (Porteous, 
2006). In all the relevant markets – employees, customers (both savings and credit), debt 
holders, equity holders, and donors – market imperfections exist. According to Hansmann, the 
costs of market imperfections can be reduced by assigning ownership to the affected patrons 
or avoiding having owners (NPOs). For the purpose of this paper, we will concentrate on 
market failures affecting customers and, when relevant, donors.  
 
The practice of ownership involves costs. Agency costs, derived from the separation of 
ownership and control, as well as the cost of collective decision-making, are well known from 
the literature and will, together with other relevant costs, be studied in this paper. The 
assumption is that, whether ownership of MFOs is assigned to investors, customers, or 
nobody (NPOs), different costs will be incurred.  
 
In our analysis, we identify cost-variables found in or deduced from Hansmann (1996). We 
start with cost-variables related to market contracts, followed by variables related to 
ownership. We isolate the effect of each variable and compare the cost of SHFs with the cost 
of COOPs and NPOs. We end each comparison with a proposition indicating, all else being 
constant, whether the ownership cost for the studied variable is higher or lower in COOPs and 
NPOs when compared to SHFs. In table four, we summarize our analysis by assigning the 
term ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ to each of the studied variables. We do not at any point try to indicate 
how much higher or lower the cost might be. When the analysis provides no clear indication, 
we assign the symbol ‘?’. We generally do not try to compare cost differences between 
COOPs and NPOs, but recognize that there can also be considerable differences between 
these ownership types. Occasionally in the text we make the reader aware of such differences. 
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We do not claim that the cost-variables analyzed are all similar in importance; nor do we 
claim that we cover all relevant cost-variables.  
 
4. THE COSTS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 
According to Hansmann (1996), the costs of market imperfections can be reduced by 
ownership assignment. In the following, we analyze cost-variables identified by Hansmann 
and apply them to the microfinance industry. We discuss how the costs of market contracts 
vary depending on whether the supplier of microfinance is an SHF, a COOP, or an NPO.   
 
Market inefficiency # 1: The cost of limited competition 
Customers pay the price of limited competition in microfinance markets: first, in the form of 
high interest rates on loans or low interest on savings offered by monopoly/oligopoly MFOs; 
and second, in the form of under-consumption, or no consumption at all, of important banking 
services. Where MFOs exist, the markets are normally characterized by a severe lack of 
competition, and most clients have limited bargaining power vis-à-vis the provider of 
microfinance. The median yield on gross loan portfolio charged by the 704 MFOs reporting to 
the 2006 MIX Benchmarks is 30,2%, the mean 34,3%, and the maximum 139,5%. In Mexico, 
the MFO Compartamos has over years maintained a ROE above 50%, driven by interest rates 
of around 100% p.a. (Rosenberg, 2007). However, in Bolivia, where competition has been 
increasing, the average annual yield has decreased during the last decade from 50% to just 
above 20% in the leading MFOs (Porteous, 2006).    
 
All else being constant, since SHFs have owners with the right to appropriate the profits, they 
should have a stronger incentive than NPOs and COOPs to exploit their customers. Yet the 
Compartamos case illustrates that NPOs can also maximize their profits. Before transforming 
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into an SHF, it also used to charge around 100% interest on the loans. However, there was an 
argument to expand outreach to more clients, not to produce profits for owners (Rosenberg, 
2007).  
 
In addition, some COOPs charge high interests on loans. For example, informal member 
owned savings and credit groups (similar to very small COOPs) often charge interests above 
100% per year. However, the argument here is to offer the net-savers a high return on savings, 
not to enrich investors (Allen, 2006). 
 
The data from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks illustrates that the larger COOPs represented do on 
average offer considerable lower interest rates on loans compared to NPOs and SHFs, while 
NPOs on average charge higher interest rates than their peers. However, when calculating the 
financial margin adjusted for operating expenses and loan losses, NPOs have the lowest 
margin while COOPs have the highest as illustrated in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Median portfolio yield and financial margins in MFOs 
 Portfolio Yield Financial 
margin 
COOP 23% 3,5% 
SHF 34,2% 2,7% 
NPO 38,6% 1,8% 
 
Other ownership-costs, like the cost of managerial opportunism, may in some contexts 
outperform the NPOs’ and COOPs’ advantage in minimizing the costs that stem from limited 
competition. However, the exercise in this paper is to isolate the costs related to each cost-
variable. Thus, when isolating the cost of limited competition, NPOs and COOPs should have 
lower costs compared to SHFs since NPOs don’t have owners that can appropriate their 
profits and financial margins in COOPs benefit the members. Thus, on average, the following 
proposition should hold: 
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 Proposition # 1: 
The ownership-cost related to limited market competition is lower in NPOs and COOPs than 
in SHFs.  
 
Market inefficiency # 2: The cost of “lock-in” market power 
Monopolistic exploitation can also occur after beginning to patronize with an MFO. The use 
of non-tangible collaterals, such as credit history and group guarantees, has been the main 
innovation in microfinance and made it possible for MFOs to mitigate the risk of lending 
(Aghion and Morduch, 2005, Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). However, an unexplored side 
effect of the innovations can be that they increase the difficulty in shifting between credit 
providers. Establishing new credit groups is complex (Marr, 2006), and if an existing credit 
group wants to shift from one MFO to another, all the members have to agree jointly. Single 
members wanting to shift need to be accepted into new credit groups. Similarly, the 
importance of credit history in lending appraisals may lead to a lock-in situation. Starting with 
a small loan, a credit history can be built, and increases in loan amounts can often be expected 
(Aghion and Morduch, 2005). However, a credit history is an intangible asset, which in 
markets without effective credit rating bureaus is difficult to transfer from one MFO to 
another.  
 
The cost of “lock-in” market power in the microfinance industry has not, as far as we know, 
been subject to a major research effort. However, as competition increases the need to remain 
in good standing with a single lender decreases (Vogelgesang, 2003). Thus, easy shift of 
suppliers becomes important.  
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There is currently a tendency in the industry to shift from group methodologies to individual 
lending. Of the 704 MFOs reporting to MIX 2006 Benchmarks, 136 practice only different 
forms of group methodologies, while the rest practice either pure individual lending (252 
MFOs) or a combination of individual and group lending (316 MFOs). Individual lending 
allows bigger loans (Cull et al., 2007), and it is possible that the shift towards individual 
lending is a response to increased competition and the need to reduce the cost of lock-in 
market power.  
 
Similar to the cost of limited competition, the cost of lock-in can be mitigated by assigning 
ownership to customers (COOPs) or ownerless organizations (NPOs) with fewer intrinsic 
incentives to exploit the customers.  
 
Proposition # 2: 
The ownership-cost related to “lock-in” market power is lower in NPOs and COOPs than in 
SHFs.  
 
The cost of asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information increases the cost of market contracting. In microfinance, a situation 
of asymmetric market information is particularly present in four relationships; MFO-
borrowers, MFO-depositors, MFO-donors, and MFO-debt holders; the last is outside the 
scope of this paper.  
 
Market inefficiency # 3: The cost of asymmetric information between MFOs and 
borrowers 
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In a principal-agent model, the principal, the MFO, knows little about how the agent, the 
borrower, will use a loan or if the loan will be repaid. Hence, all banks establish expensive 
screening and selection processes together with follow up and monitoring of the customers to 
minimize agency-costs (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). In addition, microfinance often mitigates 
risks through the use of group guarantees. The involvement of neighbors, family members, 
and friends in selecting and monitoring clients reduces the costs of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. In addition, a borrower will be less inclined to default when they know that 
friends and family members will have to bear the loss. To decrease the cost of asymmetric 
information further, ownership of the MFO can be fully assigned to the borrowers, as in a 
credit cooperative. However, a well-known challenge in larger COOPs is individuals 
exploiting the firm at the expense of other members. This is probably why most COOPs have 
difficulties in expanding outside their local communities, and also why a common bond 
between the members is seen as a prerequisite for successful COOPs (Magill, 1994). For 
example, in Uganda where there are more than one thousand COOPs, a study including 147 of 
the largest COOPs revealed that on average they only had 640 members (Deshpande et al., 
2006). Thus, we propose that, on average, smaller COOPs have lower costs regarding 
asymmetric information between MFOs and borrowers compared to SHFs.  
 
We do not propose that borrowers are more inclined to repay their loans to NPOs than to 
SHFs. However, asymmetric information between borrowers and MFOs also involves the risk 
that the MFO will use their superior knowledge to exploit customers. In many markets this is 
a major problem, as MFOs tend not to reveal the true cost of borrowing. Real interest rates are 
covered in creative contracts including countless types of commissions and fees (C-GAP, 
2003, Porteous and Helms, 2005). Regulation efforts and consumer education programs like 
those carried out by AMFIU in Uganda (www.amfiu.org.ug) are being installed to increase 
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transparency in and understanding of microfinance operations. NPOs, COOPs, and SHFs all 
tend to conceal their real interest rates. However, on average, owners with pecuniary 
incentives to exploit customers are more inclined to veil information. Thus, taking all this 
together, we propose the following proposition: 
  
Proposition # 3: 
The ownership-cost related to asymmetric information between the MFO and the borrower is 
lower in NPOs and COOPs than in SHFs.  
 
Market inefficiency # 4: The cost of asymmetric information between MFOs and 
depositors 
One of banks’ major functions is to monitor borrowers on behalf of depositors (Freixas and 
Rochet, 1997). However, the depositors are in a poor position to determine exactly how the 
bank is managing their money (Diamond, 1984). Since the owners of SHFs don’t share profits 
but only losses with their depositors, they have pecuniary incentives for opportunistic 
behavior, including risky lending (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Hansmann, 1996, Rasmussen, 
1988, Arun, 2005).  
 
In several SHFs most shareholders are NPOs, socially oriented funds, or donors with limited 
incentives to exploit depositors (Goodman, 2005, Ivatury and Abrams, 2005, Ivatury and 
Reille, 2004). Yet there is a strong push in the industry to attract more profit driven investors, 
both local business people (Jansson et al., 2004) and international investors (Ivatury and 
Reille, 2004, Abrams and Stauffenberg, 2007). Since owners of SHFs are free to sell their 
shares and several donors have a limited time horizon for their investments, more profit-
minded investors will probably enter the industry in the years to come. In the Compartamos 
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IPO in Mexico in April 2007, truly commercial investors bought most of the shares 
(Rosenberg, 2007).  
 
As a response to asymmetric information between banks and depositors, governments impose 
regulations and deposit insurance schemes. Today, even a country like Congo (DRC), 
crippled by conflict and poverty, has a banking law aimed at reducing depositors’ risk. During 
the last decade, emphasis has been placed on how to regulate microfinance operations and 
organizations effectively, and most of the important bilateral and multilateral agencies have 
commissioned policy documents and guidelines (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, Christen et 
al., 2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 
1998, Hardy et al., 2003, Jansson et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999). However, what seems to be 
generally overestimated is the capacity of such schemes to monitor institutions effectively in 
countries where corruption blossoms and banking authorities are generally weak. Another 
issue that does not seem to be taken into account is how the presence of deposit insurance 
schemes can encourage SHFs to take on more risk than COOPs (Fisher and Fournier, 2002).  
 
To minimize the agency costs related to asymmetric information between depositors and 
MFOs, ownership can be attached to the depositors (COOP) or it can be given to an 
organization without owners (NPO), with fewer overall incentives to exploit depositors 
(Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  
 
Proposition # 4: 
The ownership-cost related to asymmetric information between the MFO and the depositors is 
lower in COOPs and NPOs than in SHFs.  
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Market inefficiency # 5: The cost of asymmetric information between MFOs and donors 
Donors influence the microfinance industry (C-GAP, 2006). As depositors, donors don’t 
know precisely how MFOs use the money that is received. Even though (some) donors 
impose costly monitoring schemes like auditing, rating, follow up visits, and on-site experts, 
there is still a considerable risk that the MFO will distort the use of a donation. Therefore, 
since NPOs have no owners and, therefore, implicitly fewer incentives to exploit donors, all 
else being equal, donors prefer contracting with NPOs (Easley and O'Hara, 1983, Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2001, Hansmann, 1996). In addition, several donors face legal constraints in 
partnering with SHFs since the shareholders can appropriate public funds (e.g. the Danish and 
Norwegian agencies for development, DANIDA and NORAD). In the Compartamos case, 
where private individual shareholders captured over $150 million from the IPO, it has been 
fiercely debated whether donor grants received by Compartamos over the years have now 
made their way into private pockets (Rosenberg, 2007).  
 
If we assume that donors have a preference for poorer clients, it should be relatively 
unproblematic for them to provide funds to COOPs as long as the members are below a 
defined poverty level. Thus, several donors are involved in expanding the outreach of rural 
COOPs, like for instance the Swedish Cooperative Centre in Uganda, Malawi, and Tanzania 
(www.utangranser.se). However, most donors will probably find it difficult to partner with 
COOPs serving middle class members.   
 
If we accept that, in theory, donors prefer to partner with NPOs and COOPs with poor 
members, how can we explain the increasing number of donors recommending NPOs to 
transform into SHFs? We believe that the answer is found in understanding the combined 
effect of the 11 variables studied in this article, but recommend additional research aimed at 
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better understanding donor behavior. However, ceteris paribus, the following proposition 
should hold: 
 
Proposition # 5: 
The ownership-cost related to asymmetric information between the MFO and the donors is 
lower in NPOs and COOPs serving poor members than in SHFs.  
 
5. THE COST OF OWNERSHIP-PRACTICE 
Hansmann (1996) argues that: “ownership has two essential attributes: exercise of control 
and receipt of residual earning. There are costs inherent in each of these attributes” 
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 35).  In what follows, we analyze six cost-variables related to the 
practice of ownership.   
   
The cost of controlling managers 
With a few exceptions (e.g. PT Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia), the owners and managers of 
MFOs are separate bodies, with the former delegating most decision-making authority to the 
latter. This separation of ownership and management leads to agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b, Fama and Jensen, 1983a, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hansmann (1996) defines these 
agency costs as: “the sum of the costs incurred in monitoring [the management] and the costs 
of managerial opportunism that result from the failure or inability to monitor with complete 
effectiveness” (Hansmann, 1996, p. 38). We start by analyzing the monitoring costs, followed 
by a study of the costs of managerial opportunism. 
 
Ownership variable # 1: The cost of monitoring the management 
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The cost of monitoring management can, according to Hansmann (1996), be divided into 
three areas: 1) owners’ costs in informing themselves about operations; 2) the cost of 
communicating between the owners; and 3) the cost of communicating owners’ decisions to 
the management. These costs depend on the importance, frequency, and duration of the 
relationship between the owner and the firm.  
 
Members of COOPs entrust their valuable savings, make frequent use of the services, and 
often continue being members of the organization over a long period of time. Normally, 
members live relatively close to each other and in the neighborhood of the COOP. This could 
indicate that COOPs have an advantage compared with other forms of MFO.  However, a 
major problem in larger COOPs is the high number of owners, which leads to a substantial 
duplication of effort in being informed. The high number of owners also leads to a problem of 
“free riders,” where each and every one has little incentive to control management effectively. 
Therefore, cooperatives generally require costly and bureaucratic processes to keep the 
members informed and alert (Normark, 1996). There is the additional challenge that many 
members of cooperatives have low levels of literacy and numeracy, and limited knowledge 
about monitoring managers and banking operations. Therefore, even though members have 
personal incentives to monitor management, the overall monitoring costs in COOPs, 
particularly in large COOPs, are high. 
 
Some argue that NPOs don’t have the costs involved in monitoring management since there 
are no owners to inform or communicate with. The fact is quite different. Most organizations, 
including NPOs, delegate monitoring to boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Board members in 
NPOs are mostly middle and upper class professionals (Labie, 2001). Some of these give high 
importance to their duties, but generally NPOs struggle to recruit board members who are 
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willing to dedicate the time and effort needed to oversee operations effectively (Labie, 2001). 
To balance the need for professional board members, some NPOs have members from 
international donors sitting on their boards (e.g. several of the FINCA affiliates). While this 
might improve the oversight of operations, it also increases the costs of communications, 
travels, board fees, etc. 
 
Most SHFs have few owners. This reduces the cost of monitoring; however, with more than 
one owner, the cost of the duplication of effort cannot be avoided. One element pushing the 
cost up is the number of owners situated in the north when most MFOs operate in the south, 
and often ownership is shared between distant owners, e.g. European and American 
(Goodman, 2005). Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that the costs of monitoring 
managers in SHFs are generally lower than in COOPs and NPOs. 
 
Proposition # 6: 
The ownership-cost related to monitoring managers is higher in COOPs and NPOs than in 
SHFs.  
 
Ownership variable # 2: The cost of managerial opportunism 
When ownership and control are separated, it is impossible to prevent managers completely 
from getting involved in self-dealing transactions – those not fully aligned with owners’ 
interests. Owners with strong incentives, e.g. owners with pecuniary incentives, to monitor 
management can reduce these agency costs. This logic is implicit in most ownership 
literature, and is highlighted by microfinance policy makers advocating the need for owners 
with their own personal money at stake (Helms, 2006, Jansson et al., 2004). 
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However, history has proven that large groups of firms, like nonprofit hospitals and savings 
banks, have been able to survive without having owners with personal pecuniary incentives in 
place to control management. This indicates that there must be alternative governance 
mechanisms to ownership control that keep managers working hard. The oft-mentioned 
alternative mechanisms are: competition, legal and moral constraints, public regulation, 
incentive pay aligned with owners’ interests, and the management labor market (Hansmann, 
1996, Denis, 2001, Jensen, 1993).  
 
It should not be forgotten that most MFOs operate in countries ripe with corruption, where the 
legal frameworks are mixed, law enforcement is weak, and effective government regulation is 
uncertain. Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that the effects of some alternative 
governance mechanisms are more limited in most microfinance markets. Mersland and Strøm 
(Forthcoming) found that increased levels of competition in microfinance markets induced 
efficient operations and reduced interest rates. However, as mentioned, competition in most 
markets is still weak. Adding to this is the challenge related to the lack of managerial capacity 
in the industry (C-GAP, 2004), which reduces managers’ incentives to improve performance. 
Since no better options are available for the owners, managers can continue to produce slack 
results.  
 
Increased use of incentive pay could solve some MFO governance challenges. However, 
aligning the interest of banking managers too much with the interests of owners with 
pecuniary incentives is problematic in banking firms, since this could induce managers to take 
higher risks at the expense of depositors and other debt holders (John and John, 1993).  
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Calomiris and Kahn (1991) suggest that, since deposits can be withdrawn on demand, the 
managers should get an incentive to control expenses. Hollis and Sweetman (2007) confirm 
this argument. Using data on the nineteenth-century Irish loan funds, they find that operating 
expenses as well as salaries increased, with lower levels of funding financed by deposits. Data 
from the MIX 2006 benchmarks may indicate a similar situation today, as indicated in table 
three. 
 
Table 3: Median efficiency ratios in MFOs in relation to level of financial intermediation 
 Operating 
expense ratio 
Personnel 
expense ratio 
Total assets  
(US$) 
Non financial 
intermediation 25,5% 13,9% 4 427 864 
Low financial 
intermediation 17,9% 10,5% 6 511 754 
High financial 
intermediation 15,7% 7,2% 12 827 330 
 
Table three illustrates that higher levels of financial intermediation seem to result in lower 
costs. In the microfinance industry, this situation has normally been explained as economies 
of scale, as indicated in the table. However, it may be that the microfinance industry and its 
policy makers have overlooked the potential of having depositors as an important governance 
mechanism to lower the cost of managerial opportunism. This opposes common guidelines 
which deny NPOs the right to mobilize deposits. It should therefore spur interest among 
researchers.  
 
Labie (2003) suggests that organizational culture and cross-control between managers plays a 
major role in controlling NPO managers. Others suggest that having a clear mission, a well-
defined target public, and close alignment with important stakeholders, particularly the 
customers, will reduce agency costs (Lapenu and Pierret, 2005). We share these views. 
However, a lack of ownership control cannot be fully balanced with other governance 
 52
mechanisms. Thus, in line with (Rasmussen, 1988), we propose that SHFs have an advantage 
compared to COOPs and NPOs.  
 
Proposition # 7: 
The ownership-cost related to managerial opportunism is higher in COOPs and NPOs than in 
SHFs.  
 
Ownership variable # 3: The cost of collective decision making 
When ownership is shared between different owners, there are likely to be different opinions 
regarding policies and strategies. The universal approach to dealing with this problem is to 
adopt a voting scheme. However, regardless of being able to reach a decision with the help of 
a predefined voting scheme, heterogeneity in interests between owners results in increased 
costs of collective decision making. These costs can, according to Hansmann (1996), be 
divided into three groups: 1) decisions taken which are not aligned with all owners’ interests; 
2) the considerable time and effort it takes to participate in the decision making process; and 
3) resolving conflict between owners.  
 
In theory, investors have a single, well-defined objective: to maximize the financial returns on 
their investments. However, owners of SHFs are a heterogeneous group consisting of profit 
seeking investors, “green” investors, donors with holistic motivation, and multilateral 
agencies like the IFC of the World Bank (Ivatury and Reille, 2004, Goodman, 2005). When 
these seek to align their preferences, the cost of collective decision making increases. As far 
as we know, no study is available regarding the cost of collective decision making in SHFs 
with owners having heterogeneous objectives. And yet, particularly in transformed SHFs, 
where the original NPOs have teamed up with commercial investors, we assume that the cost 
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of collective decision making can often be high. Elisabeth Rhyne (2001) describes how 
different owners in Banco Sol in Bolivia (transformed from Prodem) at certain stages 
struggled to maintain control, with one block pushing hard for faster profits while another was 
seeking to maintain Banco Sol’s unique identity. This power play is costly. Nevertheless, to 
improve monitoring and decrease agency costs, policy advocates continue to recommend the 
inclusion of profit-minded investors as a counterweight to domination by the original NPO 
(Jansson et al., 2004). Whether the benefit of including profit-minded owners outweighs the 
cost of having owners with diverging interests should be the subject of further research. 
  
In COOPs, there is a diverging interest between net-borrowers and net-depositors (Cuevas and 
Fischer, 2006, Ledgerwood, 1999). Balancing the interests of depositors and borrowers – with 
depositors pushing for increased deposit interest rates and minimizing risk in lending, and 
borrowers pushing for reduced interest rates and increased lending risk – is a costly and 
difficult task. Still, Falkenberg (1996) suggests that the diverging interests between net-
borrowers and net-depositors can be an effective mechanism to reduce the costs in 
cooperative enterprises. Having some owners claiming higher interest rates on their deposits 
and other owners claiming reduced interest rates on loans can generate slim and efficient 
operations. The data reported in table one from the MIX 2006 Benchmarks may support 
Falkenberg’s proposition. Here, the median operating expense ratio to loan portfolio in 
COOPs is 14%, compared to 20,8% in SHFs and 27,7% in NPOs. However, since loan 
amounts considerably differ, additional research is needed for confirmation. Besides, since 
COOPs need to invest in time-consuming communication processes between members and 
management to maintain success, they can easily develop into bureaucracies or management 
controlled organizations (Spear, 2004, Normark, 1996, Cornforth, 2004, Rasmussen, 1988). 
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Thus, we suggest that the cost of collective decision making is higher in COOPs than in 
SHFs.  
 
Since NPOs are governed by missions and bylaws and not by owners, it can be argued that the 
cost of collective decision making here is limited. However, missions change and their 
interpretations vary. Trustees and founders often diverge in opinion, and board meetings can 
be temperamental. Therefore, we find it difficult to propose whether the cost of collective 
decision making is higher or lower in NPOs than in SHFs. 
 
Proposition # 8: 
The cost of collective decision making is higher in COOPs than in SHFs. 
 
Ownership variable # 4: The costs related to access to equity capital 
The type of ownership influences access to equity capital. NPOs have no other sources to 
draw upon other than excess earnings and uncertain funding from donors, while COOPs can 
also turn to their members. Further growth in NPOs is hampered by a severe equity constraint 
(Gibbons and Meehan, 2002), and the ability of COOPs to attract extra capital from their 
generally poor members is limited. The possibility of increased access to equity capital is a 
major reason for transforming from NPOs to SHFs (Fernando, 2004). 
 
SHFs are unrivalled when it comes to possible access to equity capital. There are a limitless 
number of sources and the available capital is almost infinite. Many commercial investors 
have entered or are about to enter the microfinance industry (Ivatury and Abrams, 2005, 
Ivatury and Reille, 2004, Goodman, 2005, Abrams and Stauffenberg, 2007). By mid-2004, 
commercially oriented, but still donor dominated, investment funds had invested nearly US 
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$1.2 billion as loans or equity in about 500 MFOs. Most of these investments were 
concentrated in a small number of SHFs (Ivatury and Abrams, 2005).  
 
Proposition # 9: 
The ownership-cost related to access to equity capital is higher in NPOs and COOPs than in 
SHFs. 
 
The costs related to capital “lock-in” 
Capital “lock-in,” defined as the difficulty of disinvesting capital, can be studied from at least 
two angles: capital efficiency and service availability. 
 
Ownership variable # 5: The costs of capital efficiency as a result of capital “lock-in”    
If NPOs are inferior in accessing equity capital, they are even more sluggish when it comes to 
reducing capital investment when demand declines. As competition increases, some NPOs 
risk being overcapitalized. Nimal A. Fernando, the microfinance specialist of the Asian 
Development Bank, raises the question as to whether the NPOs BRAC and ASA in 
Bangladesh have too much cash on their hands.2 Another example is Diaconia FRIF in 
Bolivia, with total capital of more than USD 13 million, of which nearly 98% is equity. To 
illustrate: Diaconia FRIF’s equity is about 2/3 of Banco Sol’s, while their loan portfolio is less 
than 10%.3 
 
While an SHF can easily move capital from managers’ hands to owners’ hands, the capital 
placed in an NPO is either lost or stays with the institution until its dissolution. Similar to a 
                                                 
2 Question raised by Mr. Fernando on the 25th of September 2006 at the devfinance@ag.ohio-state.edu 
discussion list. 
 
3 Rating report 2006, www.planetrating.com and information from www.mixmarket.org 
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SHF, a COOP can pay dividends, either in cash or as rebated prices on services, and thereby 
reduce its capital investment. However, this is not easily done since COOP managers tend to 
be powerful (Rasmussen, 1988). Hence, on average, SHFs are also more effective in capital 
disinvestment than COOPs. 
 
Proposition # 10: 
The ownership-cost related to capital efficiency as a result of capital “lock-in” is higher in 
NPOs and COOPs than in SHFs. 
 
Ownership variable # 6: The costs of service availability as a result of capital “lock-in” 
“Lock-in” of capital can be an advantage for poor households. When capital cannot be moved, 
the services cannot easily be taken away from the customers. When SHFs decide to close 
operations or shift to more profitable market segments, NPOs will normally tend to stay in 
business even if their financial return is far below a regular market return. This is also true for 
COOPs who cannot abandon their own members.  
 
The risk of capital divestment is similar to what, in the microfinance industry, is termed 
“mission drift” (Woller, 2002). Christen (2001) reported little evidence of mission drift in 
transformed SHFs in Latin America, whereas Woller (2002) argued that mission drift is 
inherently more evident in SHFs than NPOs. What should also be kept in mind is that today’s 
owners of an SHF are not necessarily tomorrow’s. As opposed to NPOs and COOPs, shares in 
SHFs can be sold. Besides, most investors, including those seeking a double bottom line, 
naturally seek opportunities with increased returns. This indicates that there can be a cost 
related to serving the poorest, and since NPOs and COOPs cannot easily divest or change 
market segments, they tend to stick with their customers even if profits are slack. However, 
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Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) did not find that NPOs are better in outreach compared to 
SHFs. Still, the benchmarks from table one seem to indicate that NPOs serve poorer clients. 
Their median loan amount is less than half compared to SHFs and 82,1% of their customers 
are women. At the same time their financial return is low, with a ROA of 0,2%. The COOPs 
in the dataset are not representative for most rural-based, small COOPs; however, since 
COOPs are totally bound to their members, divestment or “mission drift” are a minor concern 
for them. 
 
Also, studies from other sectors, like US health centers, indicate that nonprofits perform better 
than the for-profits in serving the underserved (Khoury et al., 2001). Thus, taken together, the 
following proposition should hold.  
 
Proposition # 11: 
The ownership-cost related to service availability as a result of capital “lock-in” is lower in 
NPOs and COOPs than in SHFs. 
 
6. COMPARING OWNERSHIP TYPES 
Table four summarizes the analysis in sections four and five. Based on an extension of 
Hansmann’s (1996) theory, we propose that cost-variables related to microfinance market 
contracts generally favor NPOs and COOPs, whereas most cost-variables related to the 
practice of ownership favor SHFs.  These propositions are a starting point for better 
understanding the cost of ownership in MFOs and should become the subject for further 
research.  
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 Table 4: Ownership costs in Cooperatives and Nonprofits compared to Shareholder Firms 
Proposition 
number 
COST VARIABLES: COOPs NPOs  
 Cost of market contacts:   
1 Limited competition Lower Lower 
2 “Lock-in” market power Lower Lower 
3 Asymmetric information, MFO-borrowers Lower Lower 
4 Asymmetric information, MFO-depositors Lower Lower 
5 Asymmetric information, MFO-donors Lower Lower 
 Cost of ownership:   
6 Cost of monitoring  Higher Higher 
7 Cost of managerial opportunism Higher Higher 
8 Cost of collective decision making Higher ? 
9 Access to equity capital Higher Higher 
10 Capital efficiency as a result of capital “lock-in” Higher Higher 
11 Service availability as a result of capital “lock-in” Lower Lower 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have studied the cost of ownership in microfinance organizations. Our analyses indicate 
that the costs of microfinance market contracts are generally higher in SHFs than in COOPs 
and NPOs, while the costs of ownership-practice are comparatively lower. The cost-variables 
analyzed are not all of similar importance, and local contexts will influence this. However, the 
proposed lower costs of ownership-practice in SHFs provide strong support for the continued 
promotion of this ownership type, as well as welcoming new investors into the industry. 
Nevertheless, such promotion should not be done at the expense of COOPs and NPOs who, 
according to the theory, can more effectively mitigate the costs of market contracts. Such 
mitigation is highly relevant since most MFOs operate in severely inefficient markets. It is 
probable that the development of markets with a mixture of ownership types would best serve 
the customers. 
 
Comparing this theory with current policies indicates that policy makers consider the costs of 
ownership-practice to be more important than costs related to market contracts. Whether this 
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is based on a comprehensive analysis or ideological preferences remains unanswered. We 
propose that the costs of market contracts have not been sufficiently included when 
advocating ownership policies in the microfinance industry. Certainly the problems related to 
asymmetric information between depositors and MFOs are being debated. However, the 
response to these problems, through prudent regulations, supervision, and deposit insurance 
schemes, seems to be inadequate. In developing economies suffering from very weak 
institutional frameworks as well as imperfect markets and incomplete information (Todaro 
and Smith, 2006), installing prudent regulations seems far-fetched.   
 
Several policy papers seem to be guided by agency theory applied to the relationship between 
owners and management. In addition to this, we recommend future policy papers and 
academic research to broaden their theoretical perspectives. A better understanding of NPOs 
and COOPs and their possible role in market economies is needed. Adequate use of 
stakeholder theory to help identify ‘Who’ and ‘What’ really counts in MFOs can help 
(Mitchell et al., 1997, Freeman, 1984, Freeman, 1994). 
 
We argue that ownership costs are intrinsic and thus cannot be completely neutralized. 
However, they can partly be balanced. Particularly in the microfinance industry, the use of 
hybrid ownership forms where NPOs are major owners in SHFs is common. Also common 
are NPOs being fully governed by international donors similar to the owners of SHFs. 
Besides, some international lenders to NPOs may provide long-term uncollateralized loans, 
where the rate of interest depends on the profits and the lender can be given a position on the 
board.  These examples illustrate that practitioners are aware of the costs related to ownership. 
Such balancing measurements may offer particular promise in meeting the multiple needs of 
MFOs. Thus, researchers should study the impact and side effects of such measurements.  
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 The history of savings banks can provide important insight to understand the existence of 
NPOs in the microfinance industry better. As NPOs today, the first savings banks were also in 
need of equity capital from donors, either wealthy philanthropists, local authorities, or 
community funds like corn chambers meant for lean years. The NPO ownership type, still 
present in most savings banks, gave the donors the assurance they needed to support the new 
initiatives. However, as the banks grew and started to depend more on commercial funding 
and deposits, the nonprofit form was kept, but now as a response to asymmetric information 
between depositors and the banks (Hansmann, 1996, Hansmann, 1989, Pampillon, 2003, 
Ograda, 2003, Pohl, 2003, Rønning, 1972). One question which remains unanswered is why 
transformation of NPOs into SHFs is needed today when it wasn’t needed before. Legal 
frameworks provide part of the answer. Thus, a revision to adapt the legal frameworks to 
NPOs’ and COOPs’ needs seems appropriate. The history of savings banks and their 
continued success in several markets should demonstrate that being commercially oriented 
and mobilizing savings is not necessarily incompatible with being an NPO. 
 
Imperfect markets and exploitation of customers are likely to continue in most developing 
countries for several decades. At the same time, some donors will continue to search for 
partners with less intrinsic motivation to exploit them. Hence, we expect COOPs and well-
performing NPOs to continue to play an important role in the microfinance industry. 
However, this is only possible if adequate legal and policy support is given. Historically, 
support of novel ownership forms has been important to underpin the growth of pro-poor 
banking systems like the savings banks in England and Norway, and the cooperative and 
mutual banks in Germany and the USA (Teck, 1968, Hollis and Sweetman, 1998, Rønning, 
1972). Therefore, if COOPs and NPOs are to continue playing a dominant role in the industry, 
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alongside the needed SHFs, they will need better policy and legal support. Further research on 
how to understand and support NPOs and COOPs better is needed. 
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ABSTRACT 
Policy advocates argue for the transformation of non-government Microfinance Organizations 
(MFOs) into shareholder owned firms. This paper investigates whether the proposed 
superiority of shareholder owned MFOs is empirically supported. The findings indicate that 
the difference between shareholder owned MFOs and non-government MFOs is minimal. Our 
results contradict established paradigms and policy guidelines in the industry. However, the 
results are not necessarily surprising since ownership theories support our findings. So do also 
studies from the general banking markets as well as historical studies. Adaptation of legal 
frameworks allowing well-performing NGOs to mobilize savings appears to be a better option 
than transformation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Does the type of ownership a Microfinance Organization (MFO) has make a difference to its 
performance? Since Prodem in Bolivia was transformed into Banco Sol in 1992, it has been 
argued that an evolutionary organizational process that transforms non-government MFOs 
into shareholder owned firms (SHFs) is required (Pischke, 1996). Accounts of successful 
transformations have been shared (Fernando, 2004), and guidelines on how to transform have 
been published (Ledgerwood and White, 2006, White and Campion, 2002). The arguments 
are that SHFs can be regulated by banking authorities, accept deposits, provide a larger range 
of better quality services, be independent from donors, attract private equity capital and 
benefit from superior corporate governance because they are privately owned. The claim is 
clear; SHFs perform better than NGOs. Nevertheless, the issue of transformation has so far 
created more discussion than action. Of the thousands of NGOs, only about 43 have 
transformed into SHFs (Hishigsuren, 2006). Now is the time to test the assumed superiority of 
SHFs compared to NGOs in microfinance markets. Does the type of ownership matter? 
 
A priori, one would consider that SHFs are more profit oriented than NGOs. Similarly, that 
NGOs should care more about reaching the poorest clients than SHFs. This view is put 
forward by several policy advocates and illustrated in Rock et al (1998). However, more than 
a decade ago Dichter (1996) observed (and disliked) the fact that many NGOs in microfinance 
were driven by the same economic rationalism as profit-oriented banks. Furthermore, not all 
SHFs are in the microfinance business for profit. They may have a social mission equivalent 
to NGOs. These two factors suggest that the claimed performance difference between 
ownership types is not as clear cut as assumed. 
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Performance in microfinance markets is multidimensional. To allow a comparison of NGOs 
and SHFs we use Schreiner’s (2002) highly conceptual terms to discuss the performance of 
MFOs. Schreiner’s framework is also used by USAID when evaluating MFOs’ performance 
(Woller, 2006). In his framework Schreiner proposes six aspects of social benefits for 
microfinance clients. The six aspects can all be considered performance dimensions in a 
MFO. The six dimensions are: cost, depth, breadth, length, scope and worth, where Cost is 
defined as the sum of monetary costs and transaction costs to clients, Depth is defined as 
clients’ poverty level or other social preferences like for instance the percentage of women 
reached, Breadth is defined as the number of clients served, Length is defined as the time 
frame of the supply of services and Scope is defined as number of types of financial contracts 
supplied. Worth estimates to what the degree the clients value the services. Worth is omitted 
from our discussion since it is subjective and according to Schreiner the most difficult to 
define and measure. Schreiner’s (2002) underlying assumption is that more socially oriented 
MFOs can trade-off narrow breadth, short length and limited scope with greater depth, while 
less socially oriented MFOs compensate shallow depth with wide breadth, long length and 
ample scope. Rock et al. (1998) identify more socially oriented MFOs with NGOs, and the 
less socially oriented MFOs with SHFs. 
 
We outline ownership theories and hypotheses before we test for the argued differences 
between the SHF and the NGO in three ways. Firstly, the average of empirical specifications 
of the five dimensions of performance are compared and tested for significant differences. 
Then, the specified dimensions are used to predict the organisational type of either NGO or 
SHF in multivariate logit regressions. Lastly, we test the results for robustness using adjusted 
values instead of the original variables. 
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A dataset with high-quality information from 200 non-government or shareholder MFOs in 54 
countries is used to carry out the statistical tests. The organisations share a willingness to open 
their accounts to careful scrutiny by third party rating agencies and to make their reports 
public. The organisations thus represent the more commercial oriented strata of MFOs. 
 
The findings indicate that the difference in performance between SHFs and NGOs is minimal. 
NGOs are not more socially oriented than SHFs, nor are SHFs more profit oriented than 
NGOs. SHFs’ superiority in scale and scope do not seem to be related to ownership type, but 
to the legal constraints which impede most NGOs from mobilizing savings.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section two introduces microfinance policies 
and ownership theories. Section three outlines the hypothesis and identifies statistical 
measurements. Information about our dataset is provided in section four. In section five the 
findings are presented and discussed. Section six concludes. 
 
2. MICROFINANCE POLICIES AND OWNERSHIP THEORIES 
A review of microfinance policy reports reveals that most of them highlight the strengths of 
SHFs and the weaknesses of NGOs. In particular, they emphasis that NGOs are less 
commercial and professional because they lack owners with the pecuniary incentive to 
monitor management (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, C-GAP, 2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 1998, Hardy et al., 2003, Jansson 
et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999, Drake and Rhyne, 2002). The implicit message is that SHFs 
benefit from better governance, can access more funding and thus perform better than NGOs.  
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However, an alternative hypothesis may be that SHFs and NGOs do not perform differently, 
because they may use the same business model to compete and serve customers in the 
microfinance market. In fact, different ownership forms are common in the banking and 
insurance industries (Mayers and Smith, 1983, Hansmann, 1996). In mature bank-markets 
where different ownership types co-exist, researchers find little evidence to suggest that 
ownership type influences operational efficiency (Altunbas et al., 2001, Crespi et al., 2004, 
ESBG, 2004). In a recent large European study  Iannotta et al. (2007) found that investor 
owned banks have higher profitability, but have higher operating costs than non-investor 
owned banks. In historic terms pro-poor banking has generally been dominated by mutual and 
non-profit ownership, not by investor ownership (Cull et al., 2006, Hansmann, 1996). The 
question remains; why do policy makers advocate a shareholder charter for MFOs? 
 
Ownership theories 
Most research on the effect of ownership on firm performance is rooted in agency theory 
indicating that there are agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983). These costs can be minimized 
depending on how ownership is organized and practised. According to this theory, owners 
with pecuniary incentives are more able to reduce agency costs. The implicit conclusion is 
that in ownerless non-profit organizations like NGOs, agency costs are higher. However, 
agency theory also predicts that the non-profit organizations can have an offsetting benefit of 
reducing customer adverse selection and moral hazard (Hansmann, 1996, Desrochers and 
Fischer, 2002), since they may be closer to the customers and better able to tap into local 
information networks. In microfinance where customers generally have lower levels of 
education, it makes good sense that Macey and O’Hara ((2003) suggest that the relationships 
with depositors and borrowers are as important to the success of the bank as the manager’s 
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and the board’s relationship with its owners. Furthermore, in microfinance where donors are 
major stakeholders, the principal-agent relationship can equally be applied to the relationship 
between the MFO and the donor. Donors may have more problems entrusting their money to 
MFOs owned by profit motivated investors. Therefore, agency costs in microfinance have a 
multiple nature, one between owners and managers, one between the MFO and its customers, 
and one between the donors and the MFO. 
 
The theory of ownership of enterprise framed by Hansmann (1996) further develops the 
agency theory in relation to ownership. According to Hansmann, different costs occur 
depending on who owns an enterprise. Hansmann argues that costs stem from market based 
contracts between the enterprise and its stakeholders like employees, customers, donors, debt 
holders, and from the practice of ownership between management and the owners as well as 
between the owners themselves. The argument is that these ownership-costs can be minimized 
depending on how the ownership is organized. From the theory it can be derived that due to 
owners’ pecuniary incentives, investor owned firms minimize ownership costs stemming from 
the practice of ownership compared to NGOs. However, compared with SHFs, NGOs are 
better at mitigating the costs stemming from the market contracts. Hence, according to 
Hansmann (1996) co-operative and non-profit enterprises can operate successfully in more 
imperfect markets like those where most MFOs operate. 
 
The fact that most equity holders in SHFs are NGOs, donors or socially oriented investors 
(Ivatury and Abrams, 2005, Ivatury and Reille, 2004, Goodman, 2005) indicates that the type 
of ownership probably matters less in microfinance than in other industries. However, certain 
stakeholders such as banking authorities, some debt holders, depositors and some profit-
focused investors are often unique for SHFs. Furthermore, the fact that shareholders are free 
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to sell their shares and that several of today’s equity holders have a limited time horizon to 
their investments, indicates that managers of SHFs experience a different type of ownership 
control than may occur in NGOs. 
 
In summary, we observe that the theories do not bring clear predictions regarding the 
efficiency of different ownership types in microfinance markets. However, the lack of clear 
prediction can be interpreted as theoretical support for the existence of the multiple ownership 
types that we observe in the microfinance markets as well as in regular banking markets.  
 
Microfinance studies on ownership and performance 
The literature on the performance of MFOs has generally not been concerned with the effect 
of ownership type. However, Hartarska (2005) in her study on corporate governance in East 
European MFOs included ownership type as an independent variable in her model. Similarly 
Cull et al. (2007) included ownership type as a control variable in their study on the influence 
of lending methodologies on performance. In none of these studies did ownership type have a 
significant influence on the performance of MFOs.  In another study Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) found that regulation affected neither social nor financial performance in 
MFOs. Since most countries don’t allow NGOs to become regulated, the Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak study is of particular relevance for this study. 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS AND MEASUREMENTS 
As outlined in the former section, ownership theories do not provide clear prediction 
regarding preferred ownership type in microfinance markets. However, Schreiner (2002) 
assumes that more socially oriented MFOs trade off narrow breadth, short length and limited 
scope with greater depth, while less socially oriented MFOs trade off shallow depth with wide 
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breadth, long length and ample scope. Assuming the NGOs involved in microfinance to be 
generally more socially oriented than SHFs, as indicated in several policy reports and 
illustrated in Rock et al. (1998), we derive our main hypothesis:  
 
Main Hypothesis 
NGOs are more socially oriented than SHFs. 
 
If NGOs are more socially oriented than SHFs, they should have greater depth, shorter length, 
narrower breadth and more limited scope than SHFs. Regarding differences in costs, the 
Schreiner (2002) framework does not provide prediction.  
 
We identify measurements able to explain each of the five selected dimensions. We recognize 
that no single measurement or simple combination of measurements is able to fully explain 
the completeness of any of the five selected performance dimensions. Alongside the 
identification of the measurements, we indicate expected performance differences between 
NGOs and SHFs. When not otherwise indicated, ratio definitions are from Microrate and 
IADB (2002). 
 
1) Costs to clients 
Cost to clients is the sum of monetary costs and transaction costs. We omit transaction costs 
and concentrate on monetary costs to the clients which become revenue for the MFO. The 
revenue ratio including most, but not necessarily all, monetary costs to clients is the income 
yield. In an MFO, the income yield is a function of debt costs, operational costs, loan loss 
costs and equity costs. We identify measurements for each as follows: 
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Debt Costs 
We use the cost of funds ratio as a measure together with the debt/equity ratio. However, 
because some firms have negative ratios due to negative equity, we also include the 
debt/assets measure. Due to legal constraints restricting most NGOs to intermediate deposits 
as well as the general policy preference in the industry for SHFs, we expect debt costs to be 
higher in NGOs than in SHFs.  
 
Operational Costs 
We employ the operating expense ratio as a measure. Implicit in the policy recommendations 
is that owners with pecuniary incentives are better able to induce efficient operations. Thus, 
we expect operational costs to be higher in NGOs than in SHFs. 
 
Loan Losses 
In accounting reports, loan losses can be found as write-offs and portfolio at risk and it is the 
combination of the two which ultimately informs us of the loan losses. Less ownership control 
indicates that NGOs lack some incentives to follow-up defaulters. At the same time, NGOs, 
due to their social mission, should be more inclined to accept clients’ reasons for defaulting. 
Yet, for profit-motivated organisations, there can sometimes be a trade-off between slightly 
increased loan losses and reduced operational costs. Nevertheless, we expect loan losses to be 
higher in NGOs than in SHFs. 
 
Equity Costs 
Equity cost is measured as return on equity (ROE). Equity costs are influenced by managers’ 
interest in securing their own future and reputation, but also depend on the owners’ pecuniary 
incentives. Other factors constant, equity costs should be higher in SHFs than in NGOs.  
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 2) Depth 
Depth is defined as clients’ poverty level or other social preferences such as the percentage of 
women reached. An imperfect, but useful and much used proxy for measuring poverty levels 
among clients is average outstanding loan per client. The percentage of women reached is 
measured as the percentage of the outstanding portfolio lent to women and as a dummy 
variable indicating whether the MFO practices a conscious gender bias or not. We expect the 
NGOs to reach poorer clients and relatively more women than the SHFs. 
 
3) Breadth 
Breadth of outreach is the number of clients served. Clients can be both savings clients and 
loan (credit) clients. Since NGOs in most cases cannot mobilize deposits due to legal 
constraints, their number of savings clients should in most cases be zero. Excluded from the 
opportunity to fund loans with savings, together with the difficulty in accessing debt indicate 
that the number of credit clients as well as the total number of clients should be lower in 
NGOs than in SHFs. 
 
4) Length 
Length of outreach is the time frame of the supply of microfinance. Length is difficult to 
measure, but profit is a proxy because it signals the ability to sustain the business over time. 
Since SHFs should have the benefit of lower costs and larger scale, they should be able to 
enjoy higher profitability and sustain longer than NGOs. Due to considerable variation in 
debt/equity ratios, profit in the microfinance industry is best measured as ROA and not the 
ROE.  
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5) Scope of outreach 
Scope of outreach is the number of types of financial contracts supplied. Since the 
mobilization of deposits is generally reserved for regulated entities, NGOs should, due to the 
difficulty of becoming regulated, generally not offer voluntary savings. When it comes to the 
number of credit products being supplied, NGOs are also disadvantaged due to the lack of 
scale and resources. 
 
In summary, the Schreiner (2002) model implies that NGOs trade off more depth with less 
breadth, length and scope compared to SHFs. We investigate this by comparing average 
specifications of the five outreach dimensions in table 3 and 4 for the subgroups of SHF and 
NGO. Furthermore, if the SHF and NGO differ in dimensions of performance, we should be 
able to predict organisational type from these performance dimensions. In particular, depth 
should be an important prediction variable. We study this in a simple logit model where the 
dummy variable “ownership type” is the binary dependent variable containing the SHF and 
the NGO types.  
 
Definitions of variables used in the analysis are given in table 1. 
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 Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions (when available from (Microrate and IADB, 2002) 
Cost  
A Debt cost 
Cost of Funds Ratio The cost of funds at the end of a given period, that is COF = 
(Interests and fee expense on funding liabilities)/(Average funding liabilities). 
Debt/equity ratio The ratio of debt to equity at the end of a given period. 
Debt/Assets The ratio of debt to total assets. 
Cost 
B Operational cost 
Operating expense ratio: The ratio of the operating expenses to the average loan 
portfolio, thus OER = (Operating expenses)/(Average total loan portfolio). 
Cost 
C Loan losses 
Write-Off ratio The ratio of loans that has been written off and accepted as a loss, that is 
WOR = (value of loans written-off)/(average loan portfolio). 
Portfolio at Risk (PaR 30) The percentage of the total loan portfolio with more than 30 
days in arrears. 
Cost 
D Equity cost 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Depth 
Average loan amount The average outstanding loan amount per loan client at the end of 
a given year, thus, ALA = (Gross outstanding portfolio)/(Number of active credit clients). 
Conscious gender bias? Does the MFO report having a conscious gender bias? 1 being 
yes. 
Women percentage The percentage of the clients being female or if this is not available, 
the percentage of the portfolio held by women. 
Breadth 
Total number of clients The total number of clients active with the MFO 
Number of credit clients The number of credit clients at the end of the period. 
Length Return on Assets The return on assets (ROA) at the end of a given period. 
Scope 
Total voluntary savings The clients’ total voluntary savings with the MFO as appeared in 
the balance sheet at the end of a given period and includes demand and fixed deposits. 
Loan products The number of loan products offered by the MFO. 
 
4. DATASET 
The dataset has been constructed using rating reports made public at the www.ratingfund.org. 
Reports made by the following five rating agencies are included: MicroRate, Microfinanza, 
Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. The methodologies applied by the rating agencies have been 
compared and no major differences in how they assess MFOs have been found. All the five 
agencies are approved official rating agencies by the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (C-GAP) (www.ratingfund.org).  
 
The fact that MFOs in the sample are rated means a certain selection bias in that the data is 
skewed towards the better performing MFOs. However, this is an advantage in our 
comparative analysis since much background “noise” like very small MFOs or development 
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programmes without the intention to apply microfinance in a business-like manner have been 
filtered out. This allows for more realistic comparisons of ownership types. Of the rated 
MFOs, most rating categories are represented in the data. On a uniform rating scale from 0-
100%, the average rating grade is 52.8% with a standard deviation of 17.8%. 
 
The rating reports making up the database are from 2000 to 2006 with the vast majority being 
from the last three years. The rating reports contain financial information for up to four years. 
The year the rating took place is reported as year 0, while the previous years are reported as 
year – 1, year -2 and year -3. As required, all numbers in the dataset have been annualized and 
converted to US$s using prevailing official exchange rates. The rating agencies differ in the 
information they make available in the reports. Thus, a different N on different variables and 
in different years is reported. 
  
The dataset consists of 132 NGOs and 68 SHFs. Of the SHFs, 13 are banks and 55 are non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Both banks and NBFIs are usually, but not always, 
regulated by local banking authorities and allowed to intermediate some kinds of public 
deposits. Regional distribution of the MFOs in the dataset is provided in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Regional distribution of the MFOs 
Region SHFs NGOs 
Latin America and the Caribbean 25 59 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 13 24 
Asia  16 25 
Africa 13 13 
Middle East and North Africa 1 11 
Total 68 132 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Trade-offs in outreach? 
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With the specifications suggested in table 1, tables 3 and 4 show the averages of the five 
dimensions, while an ANOVA F test gives the significance level of the difference between the 
two group means. In each year, the extreme values for the debt/equity ratio have been filtered 
out, that is, cases with values above 20 and below zero are removed. Note that the dataset 
only contains data from year 0 on Conscious gender bias, the Women percentage and number 
of Loan products. Thus, these are only reported in year 0. 
 
Table 3: The average and standard deviation of the five dimensions of performance in shareholder owned 
firms (SHF) and non-governmental organisations (NGO), years 0 and -1 
 
 SHF NGO 
F-
test 
Year 0 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
Debt/Equity ratio 3,646 3,978 64 2,137 2,725 115 0,003 
Debt level 0,512 0,319 67 0,587 0,283 131 0,096 
Operating portfolio expense 
ratio  0,267 0,220 67 0,295 0,184 130 0,341 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,082 0,059 57 0,081 0,087 120 0,951 
Write-Off ratio 0,013 0,017 47 0,020 0,043 98 0,318 
PaR 30 0,057 0,072 68 0,052 0,073 130 0,643 
ROE 0,119 0,235 50 0,070 0,389 109 0,407 
Average loan amount 701,230 657,560 67 562,292 699,577 130 0,179 
Conscious gender bias? 0,296 0,461 54 0,452 0,500 115 0,054 
Women percentage 0,677 0,300 19 0,758 0,237 55 0,235 
Clients 40900 98703 60 17352 24891 131 0,011 
Credit clients 25666 52383 66 16839 24775 131 0,110 
ROA 0,026 0,088 65 0,040 0,094 129 0,313 
Voluntary savings 5058490 17479664 65 26892 150334 123 0,002 
Loan products 5,138 4,391 65 3,492 2,234 128 0,001 
 SHF NGO 
F-
test 
Year -1 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
Debt/Equity ratio 3,294 3,150 54 1,673 1,700 107 0,000 
Debt level 0,526 0,308 56 0,549 0,298 121 0,648 
Operating portfolio expense 
ratio  0,285 0,234 54 0,320 0,206 114 0,326 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,080 0,061 47 0,082 0,111 100 0,936 
Write-Off ratio 0,025 0,039 47 0,024 0,035 104 0,875 
PaR 30 0,064 0,080 53 0,061 0,086 112 0,827 
ROE 0,045 0,261 50 0,004 0,495 109 0,583 
Average loan amount 680,869 627,311 53 626,179 886,786 112 0,687 
Clients 27449 72211 46 12350 16945 118 0,034 
Credit clients 20450 49582 52 12200 16908 118 0,109 
ROA 0,003 0,121 52 0,032 0,115 114 0,141 
Voluntary savings 2969318 8435670 55 12893 84654 115 0,000 
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 Table 4: The average and standard deviation of the five dimensions of performance in shareholder owned 
firms (SHF) and non-governmental organisations (NGO), years -2 and -3 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -2 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
DE 2,985 2,938 52 1,583 1,894 104 0,000 
Debt level 0,485 0,339 54 0,516 0,316 113 0,556 
Operating portfolio expense 
ratio  0,305 0,280 51 0,334 0,238 104 0,495 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,076 0,052 46 0,075 0,091 92 0,954 
Write-Off ratio 0,021 0,036 49 0,028 0,047 103 0,410 
PaR 30 0,064 0,089 52 0,071 0,097 109 0,633 
ROE 0,022 0,288 50 -0,086 1,282 107 0,556 
Average loan amount 709,543 633,130 39 822,469 1446,844 73 0,644 
Clients 26575 70398 46 9744 13955 116 0,015 
Credit clients 17605 41548 51 9662 13854 116 0,067 
ROA 0,000 0,106 53 0,012 0,157 111 0,604 
Voluntary savings 2052636 5150219 53 7568 53001 110 0,000 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -3 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
DE 3,031 3,164 37 1,616 2,284 72 0,009 
Debt level 0,517 0,367 40 0,465 0,302 77 0,418 
Operating portfolio expense 
ratio  0,495 0,658 33 0,410 0,350 64 0,406 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,092 0,077 32 0,078 0,066 52 0,371 
Write-Off ratio 0,015 0,021 31 0,024 0,041 73 0,263 
PaR 30 0,070 0,085 38 0,075 0,102 74 0,777 
ROE -0,101 0,688 38 0,074 0,580 72 0,160 
Average loan amount 680,869 627,311 53 626,179 886,786 112 0,687 
Clients 21495 55388 32 7073 10542 80 0,027 
Credit clients 15148 34393 37 7192 10513 78 0,063 
ROA -0,016 0,180 40 -0,002 0,165 75 0,689 
Voluntary savings 1666170 3607646 42 6679 44028 94 0,000 
 
Comments are made on all years together. The depth variables are the Average loan amount, 
the Conscious gender bias, and the Women percentage. Thus, if the depth is higher in NGOs, 
we expect to find a lower Average loan amount and higher values on the gender variables. We 
found a significant difference in the Conscious gender bias variable, but when it comes to 
Average loan amount and Women percentage, the expressed bias does not show up in 
practice. Note that N differs considerably between these two variables. The fraction of loans 
provided to women is surprisingly high in SHFs, about two thirds. Thus, the depth hypothesis 
is not supported. 
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Do we find the trade-offs with other dimensions? We found significant differences in debt 
costs. The debt/equity ratio is significantly higher in SHFs than in NGOs in all years. 
Likewise, the scope is lower in NGOs. We found significant differences in Voluntary Savings 
as well as in the number of Loan products. The differences are as predicted in our hypothesis. 
For the breadth dimension, we found significant differences for all clients, but for credit 
clients only for years -2 and -3. Probably, we need to consider the debt cost, breadth and 
scope together. Since NGOs are normally not regulated, they cannot accept deposits. This 
institutional aspect may explain the significant differences on the variables. Without access to 
deposits, NGOs have a smaller capital base to fund lending. Therefore we expect both the 
debt/equity ratio and the voluntary savings to be lower in NGOs. 
 
On the other hand, we find some interesting similarities. For instance, the operating expense 
ratio is not significantly different in any year, and the ratio is in fact lower in SHFs only for 
the two most recent years. Thus, we cannot say that SHFs are managed in a more cost-
effective manner than NGOs. A second similarity concerns equity costs, specified as ROE. 
These shows no significant difference in any year, and are lower in year -3 in SHFs. 
Furthermore, the length dimension, specified as ROA, is consistently higher in NGOs than in 
SHFs. But again, the differences are too small to be significant. However, the hypothesis was 
the reverse of what we found. Thus, it seems like the NGO does not sacrifice business 
opportunities in order to supply credit to poor clients. Perhaps, as a supplier with fewer 
products, it benefits from specialization. 
 
Do these differences together confirm the trade-off hypothesis? No. The significant 
differences seem to conform more to the way the SHF and the NGO are regulated. Since most 
NGOs are not regulated by banking authorities, they cannot offer services to depositors. This 
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is in line with Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) who find that regulation per se does not affect 
the sustainability or outreach of the MFO, but it can have an indirect benefit if this is the only 
way for a MFO to access savings and thereby access funding. 
 
If our hypothesis derived from Schreiner’s framework is correct, we would expect to see 
significant differences between the ownership types especially for depth.  Yet, we find such a 
difference only for the intention of serving women, but this did not transform into a higher 
female share of loans or smaller loans from the NGO. Otherwise, the similarities between the 
two ownership groups indicate that both have found a sustainable business model for the 
microfinance market. 
 
Predicting ownership type 
We now test our hypothesis by considering performance dimensions simultaneously in logit 
regressions. While the comparisons of means are a partial analysis, the effects may show up 
more explicitly when all dimensions are considered together.  
 
In table 5 we report results from logit regressions. The SHF and the NGO constitute the 
binary dependent variable ownership type. Since SHF is coded 0 and the NGO 1, a positive 
sign indicates a higher probability for detecting the NGO, a negative sign will pick out the 
SHF. Thus, from our hypothesis derived from Schreiner’s framework, we expect the depth to 
show a positive relationship to ownership type, while the other dimensions should show 
negative signs. Specifically, the ROA should be negative.  
 
For the regressions, we have included only those variables that are continuous. These 
correspond to those variables for which we have observations for each year. For each 
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dimension, we have also restricted the inclusion of variables to only one, except for the cost 
dimension, where from table 1 we have several sub-groups. In these regressions, there are no 
control variables. Later, we perform robustness tests to check the results. Table 5 reports the 
estimates for ownership type. 
 
Table 5: Logit calculations of organisational predictions. Years 0 to -3 when the binary variable 
ownership type contain SHF, coded as 0, and NGO, coded as 1 
 Year 
 0 -1 -2 -3 
Debt level -0.612 -0.949 -1.482 -2.128* 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.769** 2.407* 1.868* 2.615 
PaR 30  6.793 7.935* 5.217 7.745* 
ROE -0.344 -0.455 -0.232 0.964 
Average loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 3.753 6.695* 2.912 0.954 
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.260 0.246 0.996 1.201 
Observations 148 144 136 91 
Classified correctly (%) 79.1 79.2 79.4 79.1 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.399 0.377 0.369 0.449 
 
The omnibus  test is a Wald test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the 
equation are zero. We can reject this hypothesis in all specifications. The Nagelkerke 
)8(2
2R  
measure shows how much is explained. This measure gives values that are usually much 
smaller than those in linear regression models. Therefore, the statistic shows satisfactory 
results. Also, the percentage of cases correctly classified indicates that the overall regression 
performs well. Hence, the power of our statistical model is strong. 
 
Table 5 shows that our measure of depth, average loan amount, is not significant in any 
regressions. Overall, few significant results are obtained, indicating that it is difficult to pick 
out the type of ownership from the Schreiner (2002) dimensions. The negative debt level 
(year -3) and the positive operating portfolio expense ratio (years 0 to -2) have the correct 
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signs according to this hypothesis. So do the results for PaR30. But in table 5 the ROA 
(length dimension) is everywhere positive and also significant in year -1. This is contrary to 
the hypothesis that SHFs are more profit-oriented. Thus, although costs and risk are higher in 
the NGO, the NGO type of organisation seems to have developed a business model that has 
an ROA equivalent to or better than the SHF. This indicates that contrary to the hypothesis of 
longer SHF sustainability, the NGO should be as sustainable in the long term as the SHF. 
 
Robustness checks 
Are our results upset when other specifications are used? We run robustness tests when the 
debt/equity ratio is used instead of the debt level, (see table 6), and tests when ROE and ROA 
are removed in table 7. In the table 6 regressions, the extreme values of the debt/equity ratio 
are filtered out, that is, cases with negative values and ratios higher than 20 are removed. 
 
Table 6: Logit calculations of ownership type. Years 0 to -3 when the binary dependent variable 
ownership type contains SHF, coded as 0, and NGO, coded as 1. Debt/equity ratio is used instead of debt 
level 
 0 -1 -2 -3 
DE -0.097 -0.168* -0.056 -0.021 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.576** 2.225 1.899 1.093 
PaR 6.642 7.815* 4.215 10.725 
ROE -0.368 -1.149 -0.265 1.244 
Average loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 3.319 7.978** 2.748 0.092 
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.323 0.159 0.416 0.036 
Observations 145 142 134 82 
Classified correctly 79.3 80.0 69.4 78.0 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.402 0.393 0.351 0.430 
 
The results from table 6 parallel those in table 5 to a large extent, although we obtain fewer 
significant coefficients. The operating portfolio expense ratio, which was important in table 5, 
is very close to significance in years -1 and -2. The depth variable, average loan amount, is 
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not significant, and while the cost dimension variables, debt/equity ratio and operating 
portfolio expense ratio, are as predicted, the length variable ROA is positive and does not 
support the hypothesis. It is also interesting to note that the coefficient values are at about the 
same size level in both tables. This indicates that our results are robust. 
 
We also performed tests of the relation with ROE and ROA alternatively removed in year 0. 
The reason is that these variables may be highly correlated. However, the tests in table 7 show 
that coefficients are barely altered, indicating that our results are robust. 
 
Table 7: Robustness logit calculations of organisational predictions, varying ROE and ROA Year 0. 
Dependent All ROE ROA 
Bank-Nf-NGO variables removed removed 
Debt level -0.612 0.311 -0.854 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.769** 2.264* 3.753** 
Portfolio at Risk (PaR 30),  6.793 8.193* 6.303 
ROE -0.344  0.097 
Average outstanding loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
ROA 3.753 5.161**  
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Constant -0.260 -0.495 0.062 
Observations 148 179 149 
Classified correctly 79.1 74.8 78.5 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.399 0.354 0.405 
 
Last, we performed several tests that are not reported. Instead of ROE and ROA, we used the 
adjusted values presented in some rating reports. Instead of the average loan amount, we 
adjusted the figure by GDP per capita. Instead of the debt level, we used the cost of funds. 
None of these tests contradict the results already found in tables 5 and 6. The reason for not 
using adjusted variables in the first place is the loss of observations. This is important, since 
statistically speaking, the number of observations is already low. The same is the case for 
control variables. But with the satisfactory robustness results, we consider these shortcomings 
of minor importance. 
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 Taken together, the Schreiner (2002) dimensions are not successful in differentiating between 
ownership types. The hypothesis is rejected. NGOs are not more socially oriented than SHFs. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have studied whether ownership type influences the performance of microfinance 
organizations. Our overall conclusion is that it doesn’t. NGOs are not more socially oriented 
than SHFs, nor are SHFs more commercial oriented than NGOs. We concur with Dichter 
(1996) when he observed that many NGOs involved in microfinance are driven by the same 
economic rationality as any other bank. We have tested the hypothesis that greater depth in 
the NGO is traded off against lower length, breath and scope of operations. We could not 
support the hypothesis in partial tests of equality of means in sub-groups of NGOs and SHFs, 
or in multi-variate logit regressions, where the dependent variable is the ownership type 
containing the NGO and the SHF. In the partial analysis, the differentiating variables are 
associated with the access to deposits, which many NGOs are denied, and in the logit 
regressions, the depth variable average loan is nowhere significant, and significant variables 
contradict the hypothesis. The overall conclusion is that our hypothesis is rejected. NGOs are 
not more socially oriented than SHFs. Instead, we believe that the NGOs in our sample have 
found a viable business model that gives NGOs sustainability. The reason is that the ROA is 
on par, or better, than in SHFs. This indicates that other mechanisms like for instance 
competition as well as pressure from other sources of finance like donors and debt holders 
may drive the performance of MFOs as much as ownership. Thus, a more comprehensive 
understanding of corporate governance in relation to MFOs seems needed. 
 
 88
The NGOs in our sample represent commercial and business oriented organizations willing to 
be rated by third party rating agencies. This is not representative for all NGOs in 
microfinance. Nevertheless, our empirical study does not support policy advocates’ 
preferences for SHFs. Also NGOs can be sustainable, well performing MFOs. 
Recommending NGOs to become SHFs seems to be premature. A revision of policy 
guidelines is recommended. Adaptation of legal frameworks allowing well-performing NGOs 
to mobilize savings appears to be a better option than transformation, if the objective is to 
increase NGOs’ scale and scope. 
 
Our results contradict established paradigms and policy guidelines in the industry. However, 
the results are not necessarily surprising. As indicated in the theory section, ownership 
theories do not predict a clear preference for one type of ownership in the microfinance 
market. This is further supported by findings in general banking markets as well as the pro-
poor banking history, indicating that mutual and non-profit ownership can compete 
successfully with investor ownership. Furthermore, our results are in line with recent findings 
in Cull et al (2007) and Hartarska (2005). Nevertheless, we welcome more studies to confirm 
or question our findings. Furthermore, we call for studies on how to adapt legal frameworks 
so as to allow well-performing NGOs to mobilize savings. We also encourage qualitative and 
quantitative studies to compare the governance systems and their effect in SHFs and NGOs. 
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ABSTRACT 
We examine the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in 
microfinance institutions (MFI) using a self-constructed global dataset on MFIs collected from 
third-party rating agencies. Using random effects panel data estimations, we study the effects of 
board and CEO characteristics, firm ownership type, customer-firm relationship, and 
competition and regulation on an MFI’s financial performance and outreach to poor clients. We 
find that financial performance improves with local rather than international directors, an 
internal board auditor, and a female CEO. The number of credit clients increase with 
CEO/chairman duality. Outreach is lower in the case of lending to individuals than in the case 
of group lending. We find no difference between non-profit organisations and shareholder firms 
in financial performance and outreach, and we find that bank regulation has no effect. The 
results underline the need for an industry specific approach to MFI governance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of governance mechanisms on microfinance 
institutions’ (MFIs) dual missions of financial sustainability and providing banking services to 
micro-enterprises and low-income families. We identify three dimensions to this problem: a 
vertical dimension between owners and management, a horizontal dimension between the MFI 
and its customers, and an external governance dimension. Recommendations for better 
governance are made primarily for the first and third dimensions. For example, Rock et al. 
(1998), Otero and Chu (2002), and Helms (2006) suggest importing best practices in 
governance from developed countries, such as board independence and shareholder ownership. 
Van Greuning et al. (1999) and Hardy et al. (2003) argue for better MFI regulation. 
However, problems of credit risk assessment and repayment1 make governance of firm-
customer interactions potentially more important in banking than in other industries (Adams 
and Mehran, 2003b). This is the focus in the present study. For example, if an MFI has a high 
percentage of female loan clients, should it adjust its governance accordingly? Group lending is 
seen as a method to ensure repayment (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Is an 
MFI’s financial performance enhanced when the MFI supplies its customers primarily with 
group loans? 
We use recently released data from third-party rating agencies, yielding a unique dataset of 278 
MFIs from 60 countries between 1998 and 2007. Thus, we respond to Morduch (1999) and 
Hartarska’s (2005) requests for the use of better data in the analysis of microfinance questions. 
                                                            
1 Two factors make an MFI’s loan portfolio different from that of a bank. First, it is generally 
semi- or uncollateralised. Second, repayment time is generally short. Thus, an MFI faces the 
risk of steep deterioration of its portfolio in a matter of only a few weeks. 
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Microfinance is high on the public agenda after the UN Year of Microcredit in 2005 and the 
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in 2006. 
Nevertheless, microfinance still reaches only a fraction of the world’s poor (Robinson, 2001; 
Christen et al., 2004). Helms (2006) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP 
2004, 2006) consider the lack of strong MFIs to be a major constraint on the further 
development of the microfinance industry, and CSFI (2008) identifies governance as a major 
obstacle to MFI growth.  
Few studies have been published on corporate governance in MFIs. Hartarska (2005) 
investigates the relationship between governance mechanisms and financial and outreach 
performance, using three surveys of rated and unrated Eastern European MFIs between 1998 
and 2002. Governance mechanisms include board characteristics, CEO compensation, and 
ownership type.2 Hartarska (2005) includes several institutional and firm control variables and 
finds that a more independent board gives a better return on assets (ROA). However, a board 
with employee directors results in lower financial performance and outreach. The difference in 
financial performance and outreach between various ownership types is negligible.  
Cull et al. (2007) also investigate MFI financial performance and outreach by focusing on 
lending methodology.3 They use data from 124 MFIs around the world and find that financial 
performance improves, up to a point, with individual loans, and that MFIs concentrate more on 
individual loans. Governance variables, such as board characteristics or ownership type, are not 
considered. 
                                                            
2 Ownership type refers to the various legal incorporations found in MFIs, ranging from 
shareholder-owned firms to cooperatives. 
3 Lending methodology refers to the way loans are given. The categories used are individual 
loans, group loans, and village banks, which are larger groups of approximately 20 members. 
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Our study is therefore justified by the neglect of the MFI-customer dimension, the limited 
number of academic studies available, our large and comprehensive global dataset, and the fact 
that some governance mechanisms, like competition and internal board auditor, remain 
unexplored in the literature.  
Our findings indicate that most corporate governance mechanisms have little impact on MFIs’ 
financial and outreach performance. However, results show that financial performance 
improves when the board is informed by an internal auditor and has local directors, and when 
the CEO is a woman. For outreach, measured by the number of credit customers and average 
loan amount, CEO/chairman duality increases the number of credit clients. Outreach is reduced 
with individual lending. Generally, there is no difference between non-profit organisations and 
shareholder firms in either financial performance or outreach. Similarly, bank regulation also 
does not seem to have an impact on financial and outreach performance. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents an 
overview of the data sources and estimation method, and descriptive evidence is reported in 
Section 4. Section 5 presents econometric evidence. Section 6 concludes and proposes a new 
research agenda. 
 
2. GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE IN MFIs 
Governance is about achieving corporate goals. The first goal of MFIs is to reach more clients 
in the poorer strata of the population, and the second goal is financial sustainability. We analyse 
the relationship between governance mechanisms and both outreach and financial performance. 
Financial performance is assessed in terms of overall profitability, through such measures as 
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return on assets (ROA4), operational self-sufficiency (OSS5), revenues (portfolio yield), and 
operational costs (Christen, 2000). Using these measures enables us to pinpoint more clearly 
under what conditions a particular governance mechanism is effective. The outreach measures 
are the MFI’s average outstanding loan and the number of credit clients served (Schreiner, 
2002). Table 1 summarises the dependent variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables used in the analysis 
Variable Mean Std Min Max N Definition 
ROA 0.015 0.126 -0.898 0.790 891 (Net operating income)/(Average annual assets) 
OSS 1.119 0.384 0.076 2.949 614 (Revenue from operations)/(Financial expense 
      + loan loss expense + operating expense) 
Portfolio yield 0.391 0.202 0.033 1.825 895 (Interest revenue)/(Average loan portfolio) 
Operational costs 0.314 0.263 0.028 3.507 867 (Operating expenses)/(Average loan portfolio) 
Average loan 788 1377 2 24589 895 (Loan portfolio)/(Credit clients) 
Credit clients 12805 26861 74 394374 905 Number of credit clients 
 
The table confirms the high (nominal) portfolio yield usually experienced in MFIs. Thus, an 
average of nearly 40% is not surprising in these markets. All returns in the regression analysis 
are adjusted for inflation. Thus, we use real rates for ROA [(ROA – inflation) / (1 + inflation)] 
and portfolio yield. The average loan reflects the “micro” in microfinance. The lowest loan 
amount is US $2.22, the average loan amount is US $788, and the median is US $441. The 
maximum amount of approximately US $25,000 is an extreme case, which is twice the amount 
of the next largest loan. We filter out the extreme cases above US $10,000 and adjust the 
remaining loans to purchasing power parity GDP (World Economic Outlook, IMF).  
                                                            
4 Debt/equity levels differ considerably between MFIs. Hence, ROA is more appropriate than 
ROE (return on equity) when measuring financial results across different institutions. ROA is 
calculated based on operational profits before donations and taxes. 
5 OSS is a widely used proxy for institutional sustainability. Table 1 gives its definition.  
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Incentive problems in a bank have at least two dimensions: one between the owner(s) and 
management (including the board), and the other between the MFI and its customers (Macey 
and O’Hara, 2003). Overviews by Becht et al. (2003) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) show 
that governance in the owner-board dimension is important in general, while Rock et al. (1998), 
Otero and Chu (2002), and Helms (2006) underline its importance specifically in microfinance. 
In the MFI-customer dimension, an MFI is subject to problems of credit risk assessment and 
repayment because credit clients typically have little or no collateral (Armendariz de Aghion 
and Morduch, 2005). Microfinance initiatives find new ways to deal with these problems 
through group lending, character lending, and the gradual building of a credit history. In group 
lending, using either solidarity groups or village banks, the MFI delegates much of the 
screening and monitoring efforts to the group. In contrast, the customers’ relationship with the 
MFI is more direct in individual lending. Furthermore, the special nature of banks as providers 
of a financial infrastructure often requires public regulation of the bank-customer relationship. 
Studying the governance of MFIs therefore requires three considerations: the relationship 
between the owner(s) and the board, the relationship between the MFI and its customers, and 
the external conditions of competition and regulation. 
Table 2 summarises the independent variables, their definitions, and the hypotheses relating to 
financial performance and outreach. 
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 Table 2: Definitions of independent variables and their hypothesised sign with respect to financial 
performance (FinP) and outreach firm performance 
  Hypothesis 
Variable Explanation  FinP  Outreach   
CEO/chairman duality CEO and chairman are the same person  +/- - 
International directors International directors divided by board size  + - 
Internal board auditor A dummy with the value 1 if the MFI has an internal auditor 
reporting to the board + -/+ 
Board size The number of directors  - - 
SHF A dummy indicating a shareholder firm when 1  + - 
Female CEO A dummy indicating a female when 1  + + 
Individual loan A dummy with the value 1 if loans are made mainly to individuals + - 
Competition A self-constructed measure of the local level of competition - + 
Bank regulated A dummy with the value 1 if the MFI is regulated by banking 
authorities -/+ + 
Urban market A dummy with the value 1 if the market served is urban only - - 
MFI age  Years of experience as an MFI     
Portfolio at risk The fraction of the portfolio with more than 30 days in arrears   
Firm size The natural logarithm of assets     
Human Development 
Index (HDI) 
A composite country index covering life expectancy, education, 
and income (GDP per capita)   
 
The remainder of this section discusses the three dimensions of governance. First, the owner-
board dimension concerns board composition and ownership type. Board composition variables 
are CEO/chairman duality, international directors, internal auditor, and board size. Ownership 
type is a dummy variable for a shareholder-owned MFI. 
CEO/chairman duality may be a sign of CEO entrenchment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, 
1998), in which the CEO can pursue policies that yield private benefits. The Cadbury 
Committee (1992) advises against this duplication in roles. However, duality may enhance 
decision-making effectiveness. This ambiguity may explain why Brickley et al. (1997) do not 
find that firms with a CEO-chairman separation outperform those with CEO/chairman duality. 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) find that firm performance improves with the presence of 
international directors. 
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Steinwand (2000) recommends an internal auditor in the MFI who reports directly to the board. 
Ideally, the internal auditor provides the board with independent, objective assessments on the 
MFI operations. This should improve financial and social performance.  
A larger board may induce members to free-ride in their monitoring responsibility, allowing the 
CEO greater independence. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) report that larger 
boards are associated with lower firm performance, measured as Tobin’s Q or ROA. Hartarska 
(2005) confirms the result in ROA regressions for MFIs. Adams and Mehran (2003a) present 
contrary evidence from banking firms in the USA. Many MFIs are non-profit organisations 
(NPOs). Handy (1995) proposes that board members in NPOs offer their reputation as collateral 
and Speckbacher (2008) argues that NPOs need larger boards because they lack owners with 
monetary incentives to monitor their investments. Similar to Hartarska’s findings (2005), we 
expect a larger board to reduce firm performance.  
Legal incorporation or ownership type may play a role in MFI performance. Similar to regular 
banking (Rasmussen, 1988; Hansmann, 1996), ownership of MFIs differs significantly (Labie, 
2001; Mersland, forthcoming). NPOs are often considered to be weaker structures because they 
lack owners with a financial stake in operations (Jansson and Westley, 2004), which leads to 
lower financial performance than that of shareholder firms (SHFs). Accordingly, Ledgerwood 
and White (2006) and Fernando (2004) argue for the transformation of NPOs into SHFs. 
However, NPOs are believed to be more effective at reaching poor customers. These findings 
imply that SHFs should show better financial performance but reach fewer poor clients than 
NPOs. However, Mersland and Strøm (2008) find that SHFs and NPOs perform equally well. 
The incentive problems between owners and managers may be more pronounced in NPOs, but 
NPOs have the compensatory benefit of reducing adverse selection of customers and avoiding 
moral hazard (Hansmann, 1996; Desrochers and Fischer, 2002; Mersland, forthcoming) 
because they are better able to tap into local information networks. Evidence in Caprio and 
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Vittas (1997) and Cull et al. (2006) confirms this. Many SHFs are not run according to the 
shareholder value model, since they may be committed to reaching the poor (Reille and Forster, 
2008). If this were true, we would expect to confirm the findings of Valnek (1998), Crespi et al. 
(2004), and Mersland and Strøm (2008) that NPOs perform as well as SHFs.  
Allen and Gale (2000) caution about the effectiveness of monitoring; they note that the board’s 
monitoring is often ineffective due to the firm’s financing out of retained earnings. Owners may 
find it advantageous to yield control to the CEO. They show that this is more relevant when the 
business uncertainty is greater and the divergence is smaller between the interests of the CEO 
and of the owners. This may be relevant for the microfinance field because the information 
asymmetry between the board and the CEO is likely to be large, and because the owners, board, 
and managers may share the same goals. Many MFIs are monitored by an agent and not a 
principal, since they are funded by back-donors or taxpayers. Furthermore, many MFIs often 
struggle with identifying board members who have an appropriate background and who are 
willing and able to dedicate the necessary time to monitor management effectively (Labie, 
2001). Thus, we expect governance in the owner-board dimension to be less important than in 
the MFI-customer dimension. 
This encourages an emphasis on the CEO in the MFI-customer dimension. One of the 
innovations in microfinance has been the targeting of female customers (Armendariz de Aghion 
and Morduch, 2005). Female customers constitute approximately 73% of our data. We presume 
that a female CEO is better at obtaining information from predominantly female customers than 
is a male CEO, and we expect that this improved knowledge influences the MFI’s operational 
costs and overall profitability and outreach.   
The loan methodology, group or individual lending, is another aspect of the MFI-customer 
dimension. Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) point out that group lending may 
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increase the repayment rate because it leads to positive assortative matching. In other words, the 
best credit risk groups naturally come together as a result of local knowledge of trustworthiness. 
When this is the case, we should expect group lenders to show better firm performance. 
However, Cull et al. (2007) find that individual lenders enjoy the highest financial returns, 
whereas group lenders show greater outreach to poorer customers. We expect these empirical 
findings to hold in the present study.  
Stakeholders on the board arguably influence the governance of an MFI. Hartarska (2005) finds 
that employee directors are negatively related to financial performance and outreach. In our 
data, stakeholder representation is surprisingly low, ranging from 2% for debt-holder 
representation to 11% for customers. Employee directors are found in 7% of MFIs, and donor 
directors in 9%. We also find that no stakeholder group improves firm performance or outreach 
(unpublished data). 
External governance mechanisms, such as product market competition and regulation, may be 
relevant for microfinance. In general, the more intense the competition, the less owners need 
internal governance mechanisms (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997). However, Nickell (1996) argues 
that because increased competition may reduce costs, the negative effect of lower product 
prices may be outweighed. Therefore, the effect on performance is uncertain. Petersen and 
Rajan (1995) argue that the bank earns rent on survivors in long-term relationships. When 
relationships are undermined by competition, banks terminate lending to risky and costly 
customers. This can reduce outreach, and Berger and Udell (1998) confirm this for smaller 
firms, and McIntosh and Wydick (2005) do likewise for MFIs.  
Many MFIs are not regulated. Van Greuning et al. (1999) recommend a step-wise regulatory 
approach that reflects the heterogeneity of MFIs and their operating conditions. A regulated 
MFI is more likely to earn customers’ trust, which should lead to improved financial 
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performance. On the other hand, regulation is associated with costs like security requirements, 
investments in information technology, and the stifling of MFI innovations. Thus, such costs 
may outweigh the benefits (Hardy et al., 2003). When regulated, the MFIs gain access to low-
cost depositor funding. Hence, the effect on financial performance is uncertain, as is the effect 
on outreach. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) confirm that regulation has no direct effect on 
social and financial performance of MFIs, but may indirectly affect outreach if regulated MFIs 
are allowed the mobilisation of savings. 
These considerations indicate the importance of taking into account firm-specific control 
variables. Therefore, in the present study, we include the following: weights of urban and rural 
lending, MFI experience, portfolio risk, and firm size. The 2004 Human Development Index 
(Human Development Report, 2006) is used to control for country-specific effects.  
 
3. DATA ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY 
The dataset contains information from risk assessment reports from five microlender rating 
agencies, MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril, and their reports can be 
found at www.ratingfund.org. All five are approved as official rating agencies by the 
Ratingfund of the C-GAP. Their rating methodology reveals no major difference in MFI 
assessment relevant to variables used in this study.  
The rating agency obtains, at most, four years of financial data, along with data on the MFI’s 
characteristics, such as board size and composition, at each rating. The reports in the database 
cover 278 MFIs from 60 countries6 gathered from 2000 to 2007, with the vast majority from 
                                                            
6 The country list is available from the authors upon request. 
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the last four years. When necessary, all entries in the dataset have been annualised and 
dollarised using official exchange rates. 
The use of rating data may introduce sample selection bias. Few larger regulated microfinance 
banks are included in the dataset, since they have funders who demand traditional credit ratings 
offered by agencies such as Standard & Poor’s. Moreover, neither the virtually endless number 
of small savings and credit cooperatives nor development programs offering microcredit solely 
as a social service are included. The 278 MFIs in the dataset represent commercial and 
professionally oriented institutions that have decided to be rated to improve access to funding, 
benchmark themselves against others, and increase transparency (see www.ratingfund.org). We 
consider our data, which were collected by third parties, to be more reliable than self-reported 
data sources like Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org) or questionnaires. Compared to the MFIs 
included in Mixmarket Annual MFI Benchmarks (2006), the MFIs in our sample are younger (7 
vs. 9 median years), smaller (median total assets $2.9 million vs. $6.2 million), have fewer 
credit clients (4,900 vs. 10,000), and have smaller loan portfolios ($2.1 million vs. $4.4 
million), yet the median average loan is approximately the same ($433 for our dataset vs. $456 
for the Mixmarket data). Comparing averages between the two is not meaningful, since the 
Mixmarket data contain more of the very large MFIs. Overall, our data seem sufficiently 
representative. Specifically, we avoid a large firm bias. 
The panel data are structured such that annual observations of the financial variables are 
available for up to four consecutive years; however, because the governance variables are often 
reported only once, they must be assumed to be constant over the whole period. For example, 
board variables are constant. We estimate coefficients using the random effects method 
(Greene, 2003) from the model: 
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itiitit )u(Xy                 (1) 
Here,  is the mean of unobserved heterogeneity,  is heterogeneity specific to firm ,  iu i it  is 
the remaining firm-year heterogeneity,  is the dependent variable, and  is the vector of 
explanatory variables and the vector of coefficients, respectively. This formulation implies that 
the constant term in the regression must be interpreted as the average firm-year heterogeneity. 
ity itX
The random effects method transforms the original data. For example, using , the dependent 
variable for the i
ity
th case in year t, the transformed  is: rity
 litrit yy1y     where  2u2 T1 


              (2) 
Here, ly  is the individual firm average and   is the standard deviation of the residual it , 
which is assumed to be constant.  is the standard deviation of firm heterogeneity, and it is 
also assumed to be constant. T is the number of years of data, which, in this case, equals four. 
u
We calculate these standard deviations by first running a generalised least squares (GLS) 
regression assuming a random effects structure, carry out the transformations above, and then 
run a three-stage least squares procedure (3SLS; Greene, 2003) on the transformed data. The 
full procedure produces roughly the same coefficients as the original GLS regression, but the 
standard errors are smaller. Since the posited relationships, if they exist, are linear, the 3SLS is 
a valid method. One advantage of the 3SLS is that this method does not require assumptions of 
distributional form. 
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4. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
Table 3 shows the main values of the explanatory variables. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of independent variables  
Variable Mean Std  Min Max N 
CEO/chairman duality 0.147 0.355 0.000 1.000 238 
International directors 0.576 1.216 0.000 6.000 210 
Internal board auditor 0.496 0.501 0.000 1.000 226 
Female CEO 0.235 0.425 0.000 1.000 234 
Board size 7.391 3.765 2.000 33.000 248 
SHF 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 277 
Bank regulation 0.317 0.466 0.000 1.000 278 
Competition 4.414 1,626 1.000 7.000 256 
Individual loan 0.536 0.500 0.000 1.000 261 
Urban market 0.363 0.482 0.000 1.000 267 
MFI age 9.201 7.327 0.000 79.000 964 
Portfolio at risk (30) 0.071 0.105 0.000 0.980 839 
Firm size 14.887 1.367 9.856 19.337 930 
Human Dev. Index 0.684 0.120 0.338 0.863 274 
 
The table shows that the number of observations of most independent variables is much smaller 
than for the dependent variables in table 1 because the former often represent fixed firm 
characteristics.  
The mean of many of the variables can be interpreted as the percentage of firms in the category. 
Thus, 28.9% are shareholder-owned firms.7 Based on international comparison, the average 
board size of 7.33 directors is low. In addition, CEO/chairman duality is low. Half of MFIs in 
our sample have an internal auditor reporting to the board, which is also low given the 
importance given to this measurement in microfinance policy.  
23.5% of CEOs are women. This is a very high percentage, which may reflect the high 
percentage of female customers (73%). More than half of the MFIs emphasise individual loans. 
                                                            
7 58.1% of the sample consists of non-profit, non-governmental MFIs, and the remainder is 
cooperatives, state banks, and “other” institutions.  
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This is a surprising finding because group lending is considered to be one of the hallmarks of 
microfinance. 
Banking authorities regulate 34.9% of MFI firms. Our seven-point competition measure shows 
that the firm’s average subjective experience of competition is high. The measure is based on 
on-site evaluations by raters, which we transform into a common 1-7 scale. 
The urban market variable shows that 36.3% of MFIs concentrate efforts solely in urban 
markets. This is a surprisingly low percentage, considering the difficulties in reaching rural 
areas (Helms, 2006). 22.5% of MFIs serve only rural markets, and 41.2% serve both. We also 
see that the typical MFI is young, although one institution can trace its microfinance activity to 
1923, when it began to give loans to small farmers. However, MFIs have generally had little 
time to build up a relationship with their customers. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) minimum and maximum values show that firms come 
from a wide variety of country backgrounds. The inclusion of the HDI may capture some of 
their institutional differences. 
Table 4 presents correlations between explanatory variables. 
Table 4: Pearson correlations between explanatory variables 
 Int. Intern Board  Femal Indiv. Bank  Urban MFI    
 dir. audit size SHF CEO Loan Regul. Comp Marke age PaR3 Asset HDI 
CEO/chair. -0.128 0.054 -0.026 0.020 0.029 -0.089 -0.037 0.045 -0.030 -0.027 -0.016 0.091 -0.068 
Internat. Dir.  0.174 -0.149 0.219 -0.010 -0.034 0.120 -0.062 -0.113 -0.225 -0.193 -0.053 -0.089 
Internal auditor   -0.137 0.184 -0.002 0.096 0.168 0.199 -0.192 0.100 -0.054 0.212 0.114 
Board size    -0.206 0.169 -0.185 -0.008 -0.221 0.034 0.009 -0.004 0.057 -0.084 
SHF     -0.170 0.144 0.503 0.020 0.114 -0.061 -0.081 0.198 -0.133 
Female CEO      -0.095 -0.059 -0.086 -0.123 -0.069 -0.062 -0.096 0.161 
Individual loan       0.172 0.077 0.049 0.015 0.120 0.162 0.272 
Bank regul.        0.014 0.191 0.066 -0.045 0.195 -0.174 
Competition         -0.120 0.089 0.053 0.125 -0.053 
Urban market          -0.065 -0.243 -0.007 0.003 
MFI age           0.180 0.424 -0.003 
PaR30            0.106 -0.005 
Assets             -0.085 
Bold: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Bold and italics: 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Many correlations are significant. The question is whether multi-collinearity is strong enough to 
invalidate the simultaneous inclusion of these variables in regressions. Kennedy (2008) states 
that multi-collinearity is a problem when the correlation coefficient is above 0.70, which is not 
the case here. In addition, since panel data estimation gives more data points, the multi-
collinearity problem here is reduced even further (Hsiao, 2003). 
 
5. ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE 
We report results from random effects panel data estimations of the relationships between 
financial performance and outreach, as well as the variables in the three dimensions of 
governance from Table 3.  
 Financial performance 
Table 5 shows results from regressions with ROA, OSS, portfolio yield, and operational costs 
as dependent variables. 
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 Table 5: Return on assets (ROA), operational self-sufficiency (OSS), portfolio yield (PY), and operational 
costs (OC) explained by board characteristics, internal and external governance mechanisms, and firm and 
economy characteristics. 3SLS random effects estimation of panel data spanning 1998 to 2007.  
 ROA OSS PY OC 
Constant -0.418** -0.411 -0.104** 1.140** 
CEO/chairman duality -0.032 -0.154 0.118** 0.074 
International directors -0.010 -0.095** 0.010 0.037** 
Internal board auditor 0.022 0.133* -0.034 -0.018 
Board size -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 
SHF -0.012 -0.129 -0.011 0.027 
Female CEO 0.053** 0.215** 0.059 -0.036 
Individual loan 0.034 0.014 -0.026 -0.039 
Competition 0.011 -0.011 0.022* 0.004 
Bank regulation 0.005 0.056 0.019 0.015 
Urban market 0.001 0.090 0.066* 0.044 
MFI experience 0.000 -0.010** -0.002 -0.003 
Portfolio at risk (30) -0.085 0.436** -0.132* -0.131** 
Firm size 0.026** 0.119** 0.006 -0.078** 
Human dev. Index -0.100 -0.194 0.279 0.413** 
Wald F (sign.) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm years 342 303 343 352 
The Wald test (Greene, 2003 p. 107) is here a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero. A low value 
indicates null hypothesis rejection. If R  is the  matrix of Kq q  restrictions and K  coefficients,  the ˆ K  vector of coefficients, and 
r  the vector of the  restrictions, the Wald  statistic is q 2       ˆ  rRRRr)q X 1 ˆR(2 , where is the 
estimated covariance matrix of coefficients. 
X
 
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ** (*). 
 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
ROA is inflation-adjusted. ROA0 is for the most recent rating year, ROA1 for the second most recent year. The same applies to OSS0, OSS1. 
 
The models encompass explanatory variables from Table 3. The overall Wald statistic shows 
rejection of the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero in all specifications. We 
comment on all regressions together. Although the signs of the coefficients are mostly as 
expected, it is striking that so few results are significant. However, interesting results appear in 
both significant and non-significant findings.  
In the owner-board relationship, CEO/chairman duality is significant only in the portfolio 
regressions. Thus, we cannot say whether the MFI is better governed when the CEO is not also 
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the chairman, confirming the Brickley et al. (1997) result. Contrary to Oxelheim and Randøy 
(2003), we find that international directors reduce the MFI’s performance by reducing OSS and 
inflating costs. The Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) result may be because international directors 
bring a superior business orientation to Scandinavian firms. However, in MFIs, they may bring 
a culture of higher costs. The board is presumably better informed with an internal board 
auditor, and this should improve financial performance. This is confirmed for OSS. We cannot 
confirm Hartarska (2005) and the general literature that performance improves with a smaller 
board. Thus, the MFI board improves performance when it is local and better informed through 
the internal auditor. 
Furthermore, it turns out that being an SHF does not improve MFI performance. The SHF 
variable is not significant in any regressions. This is not necessarily surprising. Crespi et al. 
(2004) find similar results when they compare savings banks and commercial banks in Spain. 
Furthermore, Mersland and Strøm (2008) find no differences in profitability between 
microfinance SHFs and NPOs. 
In the MFI-customer dimension, the female CEO variable is significant and positive in ROA 
and OSS regressions. The results confirm findings in Welbourne (1999) and Smith et al. (2006) 
that women in management have a positive impact on firm performance. Because 
approximately 73% of the customers in our sample are women, the result may indicate that a 
female CEO reduces information asymmetry vis-à-vis customers more than a male CEO does. 
It may be that a female CEO knows better what products women want and sets terms that 
appeal to women. In this way, our results underline the importance of the MFI-customer 
relationship. It is also possible to infer from Table 4 that women self-select ownership types 
with superior performance. However, further analysis shows this to be unlikely: while female 
CEOs in our dataset are over-represented in NPOs, the average real ROA shows a negligible 
difference between this and other ownership types, specifically SHFs. 
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Individual loan is never a significant variable in our regressions. Non-significance in the ROA 
and OSS regressions indicates that sustainable financial performance can be achieved with both 
individual and group lending. The proposed comparative efficiency in group lending is not 
confirmed.  
External governance mechanisms show a positive, significant result for competition in a 
portfolio yield regression. Thus, it appears that MFI performance can increase with more 
competition, an outcome mentioned by Nickell (1996), and may be due to first entrants 
becoming more efficient when new MFIs enter their market.  However, the portfolio yield 
result is counter-intuitive and should be analysed further. We find no significant results 
concerning the impact of regulation, which is in line with Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007).  
We carry out additional regressions using various alternative specifications, and we find that 
they yield similar results to those reported in Tables 5 (unpublished data). New explanatory 
variables (female directors, stakeholders, the number of board meetings), alternative definitions 
(only rural instead of only urban in the market definition, MFIs per population as competition),8 
filtering cooperatives, state banks, and “other” ownership type definitions all yield results that 
are consistent with those in Table 5. We conclude that our reported results are robust to several 
specifications.  
The overall conclusion is that few traditional internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms influence the financial performance of MFIs, with the exception of internal 
auditors and local directors. The positive effect of having a female CEO indicates the 
importance of supplementing board monitoring with attention to the MFI-customer relationship. 
These results are internally consistent. For instance, the positive impact of a female CEO is 
                                                            
8 Data from the Mixmarket (www.mixmarket.org) are used; approximately 1,200 MFIs report to 
this service. 
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reflected in the negative impact of international directors, which is probably due to differences 
in client knowledge. We also find internal consistency in the SHF result. From Table 4, it 
appears that the SHF has a presumably better board structure than other ownership types; it has 
an internal auditor, a smaller board, and it is regulated. However, the SHF has more 
international directors and fewer female CEOs. The SHF, therefore, may be less able to tap into 
local information networks, and the overall result is that its performance is not better than other 
MFIs. Both theoretical and empirical studies show that a board should not be wholly 
independent of the CEO, but should also include internal directors who can increase the board’s 
access to local information. The female CEO may exert a similar effect in the MFIs. 
An interpretation of the few significant results is that Allen and Gale (2000) are correct in 
maintaining that governance is of little importance for financial performance. Although the 
results confirm their emphasis on the CEO, their negative argument concerns the board, where 
we also find significance in international directors and the internal board auditor. Thus, despite 
the small number of significant results, we conclude that governance matters for the financial 
performance of microfinance institutions. 
 Outreach 
Table 6 shows regressions of the effects of our variables on two measures of outreach – the 
average loan and the number of credit clients.  
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 Table 6: Outreach performance, specified as average loan size and the number of credit clients, regressed 
on board characteristics, MFI innovations, and external variables. Random effects panel data 3SLS 
estimation for four years of observations. 
 Average Credit 
 Loan Client 
Constant -2.825** -58.962** 
CEO/chairman duality -0.120 14.004** 
International directors -0.068 -0.201 
Internal board auditor -0.067 1.110 
Board size -0.028 0.801 
SHF -0.241 0.059 
Female CEO 0.180 4.964 
Individual loan 0.548** -6.641* 
Competition -0.020 1.410 
Bank regulation 0.234 -0.673 
Urban market -0.170 1.442 
MFI experience -0.020* 0.221 
Portfolio at risk (30) 0.331 1.784 
Firm size 0.209** 5.228** 
Human dev. Index 0.999 -33.809** 
Wald F (sign.) 0.000 0.000 
Firm years 351 355 
Average loan size is defined to be between US $0 to $10,000, and weighted using purchasing power parity GDP 
adjustments (IMF: World Economic Outlook). 
The number of credit clients is scaled by 1,000. 
 
Governance mechanisms generally have little impact on outreach. In fact, only CEO/chairman 
duality and individual loan are significant. Thus, the CEO/chairman can increase the number of 
customers. This is mainly a firm size effect. An interaction variable of the duality dummy with 
firm size is positive and significant. By instituting duality, the MFI presumably pursues a 
managerial goal of firm size maximisation (Berle and Means, 1932). 
A puzzling question is why the female CEO is not significant in outreach while she is important 
for financial performance. We argue that the female CEO is better informed, which should 
result in greater outreach. However, better information is presumably independent of average 
loan size and the number of borrowers, thus giving only insignificant coefficients. 
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Individual loans tend to be associated with higher average loan sizes and fewer credit clients. 
Group lenders have better outreach compared to individual lenders, confirming the results in 
Cull et al. (2007).  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper responds to the need for more knowledge on corporate governance in MFIs (CSFI, 
2008). Using a comparatively large and unique self-constructed dataset based on rating reports, 
the effects of owner-board relationships, firm-customer relationships, and external corporate 
governance on four measures of financial performance and two measures of outreach are 
studied in MFIs.  
Panel data estimations show that financial performance improves when the board has local 
rather than international directors and when it employs an internal board auditor. Ownership 
type, however, does not affect financial performance. In the MFI-customer dimension, we find 
that the MFI is better served with a female CEO. The external mechanisms of competition and 
bank regulation have little impact on MFI performance. In outreach performance regressions, 
even fewer governance variables are significant. We find that outreach increases with 
CEO/chairman duality (the number of credit clients), but decreases with individual loans for 
both average loan size and the number of credit clients. The significance of results may improve 
with better data. 
Several of this study’s findings and non-findings are puzzling, which motivates future research 
and the reconsideration of governance policy guidelines in the industry. We suggest the 
following five points.  
  115
First, a wholesale importation of best practices in governance mechanisms from mature markets 
is probably counter-productive at this stage of the industry’s development. Traditional board 
oversight and public regulation do not seem to be solutions to MFI governance, and the call for 
transforming NPOs into shareholder-owned firms lacks foundation. Instead, there is a need to 
better understand how the MFI can tap into local information networks, and how different 
incorporations operating in the same market influence MFI performance and overall customer 
satisfaction and outreach. 
Second, the surprising effect of competition--that it may not bring customer benefits--highlights 
not only a need for new research, but also the need to search for governance mechanisms that 
do bring benefits to both the MFI and its customers. Perhaps studies of past pro-poor banking 
systems such as savings banks and cooperatives, which once operated in uncompetitive and 
unregulated markets similar to MFIs (Caprio and Vitas, 1997), can yield new governance 
knowledge for today. 
Third, it is important to ask why individual lending reduces outreach, noting that MFIs tend to 
shift from group loans to individual loans (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). The 
results in Table 5 indicate that individual lending is not related to improved financial results, so 
why are MFIs shifting in their methodology when it lowers outreach? New dedicated studies 
are necessary to better understand the trade-offs in lending methodology. 
Fourth, the negative effect of international directors on MFI financial performance warrant 
further research into the effect of international influence on MFI performance. Numerous 
international actors such as lenders, consultants, investors, networks, donors, and service 
providers are active in the microfinance industry. What is their impact? Does their presence 
hinder the MFI in its efforts to build relationships with local stakeholders? 
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Finally, the low stakeholder representation found in MFI boards deserves further study. Who is 
actually governing MFIs, and how do they govern? Are most MFIs fundamentally dominated 
by managers, and if so, does it matter? 
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 ABSTRACT 
Microfinance is high on the public agenda, and better corporate governance has been 
identified as a key factor for enhancing the viability of the industry. However, recent literature 
on the subject struggles to identify the corporate governance mechanisms that influence the 
performance of the Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs). Guided by stakeholder and agency 
theories, this paper uses a historical parallel found in savings banks to present corporate 
governance lessons for MFIs, particularly non-profit MFIs, today. The findings indicate that 
monitoring by bank associations, depositors, donors, and local communities was important in 
securing the survival of savings banks. In addition, a willingness to expand their mission to 
serve wealthier customers alongside the poor helped the banks become financially viable. 
These findings could prompt a rethinking of microfinance governance, which stresses 
regulation, for-profit ownership, and traditional vertical board control. The paper argues that a 
broader and more stakeholder-based understanding of corporate governance is necessary. 
Moreover, the paper demonstrates that historical studies can provide governance lessons for 
today. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance, the supply of banking services to the poor, is high on the public agenda and is 
attracting increased interest from academics. The development-enhancing aspect of 
microfinance has been recently recognised with the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to 
Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank. Microfinance is also increasingly becoming an 
investment opportunity. The total stock of foreign capital investment in microfinance more 
than tripled between 2004 and 2006, to US$4 billion, with the establishment of 40 new 
specialised international investment funds (Reille and Foster, 2008). 
 
A new type of firm, called a Micro Finance Institution (MFI), has become the provider of 
microfinance services. A typical characteristic of an MFI is its dual mission to serve the poor 
and remain financially sustainable. Most MFIs are sponsored by donors, and incorporated as 
non-profit organizations or member-owned cooperatives (Mersland, Forthcoming).  
 
A recent report identified corporate governance as a principal risk facing microfinance, 
threatening its role as both a business and a social service (CSFI, 2008). However, studies by 
Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) and Hartarska (2005) find that best practice governance 
mechanisms from regular firms in mature markets do not generally have much influence on 
the performance of the MFIs. Thus, there is a need for a different and more original approach 
to identify and better understand the governance mechanisms that can enhance MFIs’ long-
term survival. In line with the recommendation in Mersland (Forthcoming), this paper uses a 
historical parallel found in nineteenth century savings banks to identify and present corporate 
governance lessons for MFIs today. To my knowledge, this type of historical study represents 
a novel approach in both the microfinance and in the corporate governance literatures.  
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 This paper outlines how non-profit MFIs and savings banks share the ownership premise of 
being non-profit organizations. A non-profit organisation is influenced by several 
stakeholders, but no particular group or person can legally claim ownership or receive 
residual earnings from it (Hansmann, 1996, Mersland, Forthcoming). Thus, savings banks and 
non-profit MFIs are similar, both legally and economically. The paper therefore argues that 
particularly non-profit MFIs could potentially learn important governance lessons from the 
original savings banks. One challenge in the governance of non-profit organizations is the fact 
that managers serving as agents are supervised by donor organizations, who also serve as 
agents (Varian, 1990). Thus, traditional board governance may be less effective in non-profit 
MFIs (Glaeser, 2002). A broader perspective is required and attempted in this paper. 
 
Microfinance is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, several pro-poor banking systems preceded 
it. Some, like savings banks and savings and credit cooperatives, continue to be important 
banking organisations throughout the world, while others, like Irish and English loan funds, 
have disappeared (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998). Caprio and Vittas (1997) explain how the 
financial systems in developing countries today can learn from the financial systems of 
Western countries in the nineteenth century.   
 
Modern microfinance was born as a response to the frustrated development resulting from 
subsidised rural credit in the 1950s and 1960s (Adams and Fitchett, 1992). Thus, learning 
from history is inherent in its philosophy. However, the importance of learning from banking 
history is generally unexplored in the microfinance literature, though exceptions do exist. 
Fälting et al. (2006) drew a parallel between the early development of the Swedish savings 
banks. Hollis and Sweetman (1998) identify lessons to be learned from six different historic 
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European pro-poor banking systems (not the savings banks though), and these researchers 
(2004) also drew parallels with the seventeenth-century Irish loan funds. Seibel (2003) and 
Guinnane (2002) draw attention to how financial history demonstrates the need for 
appropriate legal frameworks in the development of pro-poor financial systems. However, no 
previous historical microfinance study has drawn attention to corporate governance.   
 
In order to identify the governance mechanisms that enabled the survival of savings banks, 
this paper reviews the historical literature on the subject. The findings indicate that bank 
associations, mismatches in liability/asset maturity (deposits on demand), local communities, 
and donors risking their personal reputations were important tools to discipline managers and 
secure the survival of the banks. The banks operated under either a friendly regulatory regime 
or under no regime at all. In the initial years, the banks did not face much competition. 
However, competition gradually became a major factor in disciplining the managers, and it is 
considered one of the main causes for savings banks’ continued success in several markets 
today. The banks’ willingness to expand their mission by serving poor customers alongside 
the more wealthy helped their financial viability. 
 
These findings could prompt a revision in thoughts on microfinance governance, which 
stresses regulation and traditional vertical board control. The lessons from the savings banks 
indicate that a broader and stakeholder-based understanding of corporate governance is 
necessary to secure the long-term survival of a pro-poor banking system. Besides, the pursuit 
of financial objectives should be pragmatic. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores the early history of savings banks; Section 
3 discusses theoretical views on microfinance governance; Section 4 identifies potential 
 125
corporate governance mechanisms in pro-poor banking and discusses their relevance to 
historic savings banks and modern non-profit MFIs; Section 5 discusses previous findings in 
order to identify lessons for today; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE SAVINGS BANKS 
To understand the birth of savings banks, one must analyse their initial context. The 
ideological movement out of which savings banks were born was a search for new initiatives 
to improve the living conditions of the poor (Tucker, 1991, Rønning, 1972). Thrift and 
savings were introduced as means to avoid poverty and become rich (Tucker, 1991). 
Therefore, the establishment of the first savings banks was a response to a new doctrine of 
self-help (Horne, 1947). At the same time, this doctrine was convenient for the wealthy and 
the local authorities, who were able to continue a laissez faire policy of  poverty assistance 
(Fishlow, 1961, Clemmensen, 1985). 
 
Industrialisation was another driving force behind the establishment of savings banks. Low 
wage earners arriving in the cities needed a safe and convenient place to deposit their money. 
The existing commercial banks showed little interest in serving the wage earners with savings 
facilities (Teck, 1968). At the same time, the lack of regulation, in combination with banks’ 
reputation for speculation and exploitation of customers, made contracting with investor-
owned commercial banks too risky for poor depositors (Hansmann, 1996, Hansmann, 1989).  
 
The first savings banks emerged in the late eighteenth century in Europe. By the second half 
of the nineteenth century, there were hundreds of banks in most European countries, as well 
as in the US (Pampillon, 2003, Teck, 1968, Horne, 1947). The pattern was the same in all 
countries: banks were first established in the cities and spread to smaller villages after some 
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decades (Rønning, 1972, Clemmensen, 1985). The banks were not organised by the poor 
themselves, but by the upper class, often in coordination with the local authorities and the 
priesthood (Rønning, 1972, Pohl, 2003, Clemmensen, 1985, Horne, 1947). The initiators were 
motivated by a combination of altruistic philanthropy and the self-interest of letting the poor 
help themselves. During the initial years, the management of savings banks was typically 
based on the promoters’ voluntary work. Banks were only open a few hours during the month 
(Rønning, 1972, Clemmensen, 1985, Horne, 1947), and this low-cost operational mode made 
it possible for the savings banks to rapidly become financially sustainable.  
 
Governments actively supported the establishment of savings banks. Subsidies in the form of 
sponsored earnings on public bonds, exemption on stamp duties, or permission to charge loan 
interest above the legal ceiling were common. However, they were not imperative in securing 
the banks’ operations, as most operations were carried out by volunteers, and operational 
income covered other costs (Pampillon, 2003, Rønning, 1972, Horne, 1947). 
 
The investment policy of the savings banks followed two main patterns, referred to as the 
Continental and Atlantic models. The Continental model canalised the captured savings into 
local loans while the Atlantic model canalised the funds into public bonds only (Pampillon, 
2003). The models used by different European countries are presented in Table 1. The 
Continental model is divided into two parts: the guaranteed model and the pure model 
whereas in the first a public entity (normally the local municipality) guarantees the deposits 
while the second does not contain a public guarantee scheme.  
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 Table 1: Savings banks models in different European countries (adapted from Pampillon, 2003) 
Atlantic Continental 
 Guaranteed Pure 
United Kingdom Germany (municipality) Germany (private) 
Belgium Austria (municipality) Austria (private) 
Ireland Denmark (municipality) Denmark (private) 
France  Spain 
Portugal  Finland 
Luxemburg  Holland 
Greece  Italy 
  Portugal 
  Sweden 
  Norway 
 
Savings banks have been criticised for their claim that they successfully reached the poorest 
members of the community (Fälting et al., 2006, Ograda, 2003, Rønning, 1972). For example, 
Fishlow (1961) presents evidence that, in some of the UK savings banks in 1830, only 11.2% 
of the deposits were made to accounts of less than £20, which represented nearly one year’s 
wage for a manufacturing operative or agricultural labourer. However, (Horne, 1947) argues 
that most of the customers in England belonged to the poorer classes, and for Germany, 
Guinnane (2002) claims that savings banks were able to fulfil their mission to reach the 
poorer classes relatively well, which ran parallel to serving the middle class. In Scandinavia 
the banks attracted deposits from both the poor and the not so poor and rapidly penetrated 
society. In 1884, 18.8% of the Norwegian population, 19.8% of the Swedish population, and 
32.3% of the Danish population had their own account in a savings bank (Egge, 1972). 
 
In the banks where deposits were recycled into loans, emphasis was placed upon safety. Most 
of the initial lending was supplied to relatively wealthy borrowers who could offer formal 
collateral (Fälting et al., 2006, Rønning, 1972, Clemmensen, 1985, Vittas, 1997). Over time, 
lending was gradually extended to include mortgages, as well as farming and manufacturing 
loans to less wealthy customers (Fälting et al., 2006, Guinnane, 2002).  
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 Altogether it seems clear that in most savings banks the poor were served alongside the not so 
poor. Thus, instead of arguing that the inclusion of wealthier customers led to a drift away 
from the savings banks’ mission, one can argue that such a policy of inclusion was required 
for savings banks to survive as a financial system. Through the inclusion of wealthier 
customers, the savings banks managed to increase their assets, thereby improving their 
operational costs and enabling their long-term sustainability. Besides, loans funded by 
deposits of the poor were more secure in the hands of those who could offer formal collateral.  
 
Comparing the historic savings banks with today’s non-profit MFIs 
The brief description of the origins of the savings banks invites a comparison with today’s 
non-profit MFIs. First, both types of organisations have a mission to fight poverty, operating 
as non-profits without any legal owners. As with savings banks, the doctrine behind MFIs is 
self-help, and the promoters are people outside the target population. However, while the 
savings banks were promoted by the local elite, non-profit MFIs are mainly promoted by 
international donor organizations (C-GAP, 2006, Helms, 2006).  
 
A major difference between the organisations is that savings banks focused on savings, 
whereas most non-profit MFIs focus on credit. Thus, capital for on-lending stems from local 
depositors in savings banks, while it stems from international donors and lenders in non-profit 
MFIs. The lack of savings mobilisation and the dependency upon outside funding has long 
been a major concern in microfinance (Helms, 2006), and the current international financial 
crisis has revived the debate.1 MFIs struggle to reach the poorest customers (Helms, 2006). 
                                                 
1 Currently (November 2008) the effect of the credit crunch and the international financial crisis on microfinance 
is being heavily debated (for example at the European Microfinance Week, 12-14 November, 2008 in 
Luxembourg). Preliminary conclusions seem to be that the crisis may actually increase the demand for 
microfinance services as wage earners will be pushed into self-employment. However, the crisis may hit hard 
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Yet, compared to savings banks, they have been more successful in issuing credit to the target 
population. The level of financial sustainability in savings banks was high due to the low cost 
of operations. However, many MFIs struggle to become financially sustainable. A recent 
survey of 704 MFIs by the Microbanking Bulletin (2007) reveals that 41% are not financially 
self-sustainable. Table 2 summarises the main similarities and differences between the two 
types of organisations. 
 
Table 2: Comparison between the savings banks and non-profit MFIs 
Issue Savings Banks Non-profit MFIs 
Mission To fight poverty To fight poverty 
Doctrine Self-help  Self-help 
Promoters  Local individual philanthropists International donors  
Type of ownership Non-profit Non-profit 
Dependence on subsidies Low, but some High, but decreasing 
Level of sustainability High Low/Medium, but improving 
Financial service in focus Savings first and credit later Credit only due to regulation 
Capital for on-lending From local depositors From international donors and 
lenders 
Success in reaching the 
poorest 
Questioned in credit delivery. 
Relatively good in savings 
Relatively good, but do not reach 
the very poorest 
 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITERATURE AND THEORY 
There have been two recent, rigorous studies on corporate governance in relation to MFIs. 
Hartarska (2005) uses different datasets spanning 46 to 144 observations from East European 
MFIs, while Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) use a global dataset including 278 rated 
MFIs from 60 countries. These studies explore the effect of traditional governance 
mechanisms such as board composition and size, managerial incentives, ownership type, and 
regulation. However, consistency in findings within and across studies is rare. Both studies 
struggle to identify significant governance influence. For example, consider the results from 
Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) presented in Table 3: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
those MFIs that depend on international funding, thus the importance of being funded locally and with deposits 
will be revived.  
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Table 3: The effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of MFIs. Results from 
Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming), Table 5 
Return on assets (ROA), operational self-sufficiency (OSS), portfolio yield (PY), and operational costs (OC) 
explained by board characteristics, internal and external governance mechanisms, and firm and economy 
characteristics. Random effects panel data 3SLS estimation spanning the period 1998 to 2007.  
 ROA OSS PY OC 
Constant -0.418** -0.411 -0.104** 1.140** 
CEO/chairman duality -0.032 -0.154 0.118** 0.074 
International directors -0.010 -0.095** 0.010 0.037** 
Internal board auditor 0.022 0.133* -0.034 -0.018 
Board size -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 
Share Holder Ownership  -0.012 -0.129 -0.011 0.027 
Female CEO 0.053** 0.215** 0.059 -0.036 
Individual loan methodology 0.034 0.014 -0.026 -0.039 
Competition index 0.011 -0.011 0.022* 0.004 
Bank regulation 0.005 0.056 0.019 0.015 
Urban market 0.001 0.090 0.066* 0.044 
MFI experience 0.000 -0.010** -0.002 -0.003 
Portfolio at risk (30) -0.085 0.436** -0.132* -0.131** 
Firm size 0.026** 0.119** 0.006 -0.078** 
Human dev. Index -0.100 -0.194 0.279 0.413** 
Wald F (sign.) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm years 342 303 343 352 
 
As indicated in Table 3, Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) find that a female CEO and an 
internal auditor reporting to the board is associated with better financial performance, while 
international directors on the board increase costs and reduce operational self-sufficiency. 
Other governance variables are insignificant or inconsistent. Hartarska (2005) finds strong 
support for independent boards with limited employee participation. None of the variables 
significant in the two studies are explored in both.  
 
The non-findings in the two studies are actually the most interesting. For example, both 
Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) find that neither regulation, nor a 
for-profit ownership structure advance MFIs’ performance. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) 
confirm the finding that regulation has no effect, while Mersland and Strøm (2008) confirm 
that ownership of MFIs does not matter. Both Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm 
(Forthcoming) conclude that governance matters, but the traditional governance mechanisms 
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seem to matter less in MFIs relative to firms in mature markets. They call for better data and 
the study of alternative governance mechanisms in order to better understand the effect of 
corporate governance in the microfinance industry.  
 
Contrary to the findings in Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming), the 
practitioner-oriented literature on governance in MFIs emphasises traditional, vertical 
governance, like the composition and role of boards (Rock et al., 1998, Otero and Chu, 2002).  
This body of literature also emphasises a need to transform from non-profit to for-profit 
ownership (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). The practitioner literature generally follows the 
logic of agency theory, where the aim is to reduce agency costs stemming from vertical 
relationships between owners and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). MFIs are recommended to set up governance systems in order to mitigate 
agency costs by aligning top management with owners’ goals and putting controls into place 
(Rock et al., 1998, Otero and Chu, 2002, Helms, 2006). Despite the fact that Hartarska (2005) 
and Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) do not find empirical support for the effect of these 
recommendations, they are not necessarily wrong. However, they do not sufficiently account 
for the fact that most MFIs do not intend to be shareholder owned, have multiple goals, and 
do not have an inherent profit motive. Moreover, MFIs differ from regular firms in that they 
encounter horizontal agency problems between the bank and its customers (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003), and donor-funded MFIs face agency costs in their relationships with donors. 
 
Thomsen (2008) and Hansmann (1996) suggest that the importance of owners monitoring 
management has been overstated. The degree of product market competition and customer-
firm relationships seems to discipline managers more effectively than owners (Hansmann, 
1996). The problem is exacerbated in microfinance, since the customer has little or no 
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collateral or credit history, low education level, and little knowledge of the MFI. Moreover, 
the regulatory ability of local regimes is generally low. Under such conditions, issues such as 
closeness to the customer and mutual trust are paramount. There is thus a need for a broader 
set of governance mechanisms that account for agency costs stemming from multiple 
stakeholders. 
 
Stakeholder theorists widen the approach of agency costs in arguing that, in addition to 
responding to owners’ interests, manager must balance the needs of several stakeholders, such 
as employees, customers, local communities, authorities and debt holders (Freeman, 1984, 
Mitchell et al., 1997). For the non-profit MFIs as for the savings banks, stakeholder theory 
helps establish a broader understanding and identifies who and what counts in the governance 
of these organisations (Mersland, Forthcoming).  
 
4. GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN THE SAVINGS BANKS AND THE MFIs 
This section uses theory to identify and understand corporate governance mechanisms in pro-
poor banking. For each mechanism identified, the historical literature on savings banks is 
studied in order to analyse its effect upon governance. The analysis of each mechanism is 
concluded by assessing whether it has affect in the governance of non-profit MFIs today. The 
mechanisms covered were identified through a review of the historic savings banks literature 
and are comprised of the following: the organisation’s mission, boards, donors, public 
regulation, apex associations, market competition, maturity mismatches in liabilities/assets, 
and the influence of local communities and governments.  
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The mission of the organisation  
Non-profit organisations do not have owners and are accountable to their missions 
(Hansmann, 1996). Stakeholders influence a non-profit organisation’s mission and monitor its 
fulfilment. The stakeholders with the most bargaining power are those with the most influence 
over the organisation’s mission. A clearly defined and well-informed mission reduces the cost 
of disagreements and bargaining between stakeholders (Speckbacher, 2008).  
 
The mission in the savings banks 
A striking feature in the history of savings banks is the ability of the banks to change their 
mission at an early stage of development. Vittas (1997) explains how savings banks were 
created to serve the poor through saving services, but they quickly reoriented their services to 
include the middle class and facilitated credit when legislation allowed. However, most banks 
continued to serve the poor, expanding their mission rather than departing from it. This shift 
made savings banks more financially sustainable, and at the same time it helped them reach 
out to larger markets. Altogether the banks went through a process of reorientation. In the 
beginning, there was the belief that savings and thrift could eliminate poverty and that the 
poor would be easily recruited. This enthusiastic phase was soon replaced by a more realistic 
understanding of the possibilities. Many of the poor were not able or willing to save and 
handling only small customers led to high operational costs. Loans were issued to wealthier 
clients in order to be secured. There was no lack of critical voices as the savings banks 
expanded their mission, but the pragmatic approach was approved by all surviving banks.  
 
Mission in the MFIs 
As with the savings banks, modern microfinance experienced an enthusiastic first stage, 
culminating in the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Mohammad Yunus and Grameen 
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Bank in 2006. However, insiders in the industry have long been aware of the limitations 
(Dichter and Harper, 2007). Reaching the poorest is a struggle, and the impact from access to 
services is often low, especially for those with limited access to assets, knowledge, and 
networks before contracting loans (Hulme, 2000). Some MFIs are comfortably serving some 
wealthier clients alongside the poor, but as a whole the industry has still not reached the 
pragmatic stage and the mission drift debate remain lively (Morduch, 2000).  
 
Boards 
Boards are a generic corporate governance mechanism to minimise agency costs stemming 
from the separation of owners/donors and management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Boards 
monitor, replace management, ratify major decisions, and bring in important networks and 
knowledge. Well-functioning boards ought to reduce agency costs and enhance organisational 
performance. However, the empirical evidence from for-profit firms indicates that, on 
average, boards matter little (Thomsen, 2008). Speckbacher (2008) argues that, since non-
profit organisations lack owners, their boards play a more important role than those of for-
profit firms. Board members of non-profit organisations offer their reputation as collateral to 
the public and try to minimise the risk of losing it (Handy, 1995).  
 
Boards in the savings banks 
Since the origin of savings banks, boards have overseen their operations (Teck, 1968, 
Fishlow, 1961, Rønning, 1972). Initially, board members would not have any direct or 
indirect business relationship with the bank, implying full independence. Later, however, it 
became normal in some banks to provide loans to board or founding members, and their 
children and servants were often depositors (Horne, 1947, Rønning, 1972). A board position 
was fully voluntary, and the boards were formed by the upper class including pastors and 
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teachers (Fishlow, 1961, Fälting et al., 2006, Rønning, 1972, Ograda, 2003, Horne, 1947). As 
time went by, the bourgeoisie were gradually replaced by professionals, such as lawyers, 
accountants, and business managers (Clemmensen, 1985, Rønning, 1972). During the initial 
years, the participation of the target group, the poor, in the board was unthinkable. 
 
As the savings banks started serving also less poor customers, some banks struggled to 
maintain the interest of their initial philanthropic founders (Rønning, 1972). This is illustrated 
in the first annual report of the Cork Saving Banks in Ireland (founded in 1817):  
‘this species of deposits [high amounts], if continued, could eventually close the Bank, 
as no gentleman could be got to give their time gratuitously as mangers to conduct the 
money dealing of their equals and in many cases their superiors in rank and property’ 
(cited in Ograda, 2003, p. 35).  
However, even if the savings banks struggled to maintain the interest of their board members 
and gradually became more and more management dominated, it seems likely that they 
indirectly continued to provide some basic monitoring in order to protect their own reputation. 
Moreover, it seems likely that the banks capitalised upon the reputation of their founders. 
Gradually other stakeholders, like representatives from local governments and later customers 
and employees, were invited on the boards (Fälting et al., 2006, Guinnane, 2002).  
 
Boards in MFIs 
MFIs today follow a traditional separation of management and board. Board members of non-
profit MFIs are generally upper- or middle-class professionals. Similar to the savings banks, 
many MFIs struggle to identify board members with an appropriate background who are able 
and willing to dedicate the time that effective monitoring requires (Labie, 2001). Stakeholders 
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like donors, customers, employees, and debt holders are generally absent from MFI boards 
(Mersland and Strøm, Forthcoming).  
 
Donors 
Donors monitor organizations to verify that their donations are used in accordance with their 
wishes (Fama and Jensen, 1983). When donors are individuals, they have a direct agency 
relationship with the firm. However, when donors are organisations funded by back-donors or 
taxpayers, the firm is monitored by an agent rather than a principal (Varian, 1990). 
 
Donors to the savings banks 
Savings banks were founded by wealthy philanthropists who donated initial capital. However, 
this initial capital was rarely substantial (Hansmann, 1996). Still, donor involvement was 
important, and they often took seats on the board. The monitoring they offered, the social 
capital, and their reputations were more important than their financial capital (Fälting et al., 
2006).  Donations were largely confined to the formation of the banks. After their 
establishment, the banks were fully dependent upon operational income and voluntary work 
(Hansmann, 1996). After their initial donations, the donors contributed knowledge, reputation, 
and governance, but generally not additional funding. 
 
Donors to the MFIs 
While non-profit ownership of the savings banks was chosen in order to protect customers 
(Hansmann, 1996), most MFIs seem to have chosen non-profit ownership as a means to tap 
into donors’ pockets (Mersland, Forthcoming). The term ‘briefcase NGO,’ referring to 
organisations formed by private individuals, is well-known. The term also indicates that 
several donors practice slack control, permitting personal benefits to individuals. 
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 Donors play a major role in the microfinance industry (C-GAP, 2006). Donations stem from 
international NGOs and the bilateral and multilateral donor communities. These organisations 
are funded by back-donors, either private philanthropists or taxpayers. Therefore, MFIs face 
the governance challenge that managers serving as agents are supervised by donors, who also 
serve as agents (Varian, 1990). This structure differs from that of savings banks, where the 
donors of initial capital were private individuals who often took a board position in addition. 
In contrast, few donors take board seats in MFIs (Mersland and Strøm, Forthcoming). 
 
Regulation 
Bank regulation has the potential to seriously affect the performance of a bank or an MFI. 
However, developing economies suffer from very weak institutional frameworks, imperfect 
markets, and incomplete information. Weak regulatory ability is a major reason for the 
existence of non-profit organisations. While privately-owned banks have strong incentives to 
invest in risky projects, a non-profit bank is less likely to employ depositors’ money in risky 
endeavours (Hansmann, 1996).  
 
Regulation in the savings banks 
Except that some countries obliged the savings banks to invest in public bonds, the banks 
were generally unregulated or operated under a friendly regulatory regime. The necessary 
trust was generated not by law, but by the reputation offered by the local elite who actively 
promoted the banks. Where regulation was introduced the objective was often to let the banks 
adhere to a few basic rules to insure that operations were concentrated on non-wealthy 
customers (Guinnane, 2002). In other countries the main purpose of regulation was to allow 
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the banks subsidised interest on public bonds or to exempt them from stamp duties (Fishlow, 
1961, Rønning, 1972). 
 
However, as the level of savings grew and investment in less secure assets became more 
common, legislators gradually responded with additional regulation (Fälting et al., 2006, 
Rønning, 1972). Yet the regulatory framework installed was friendly, intended to strengthen 
public confidence in banks. However, in some countries, like Spain and Denmark, where 
regulation was introduced as a means to enhance public trust, the result was often the opposite 
leading to withdrawal of deposits (Martinez, 1998) or lowered expansion (Hansen, 2001).   
 
Regulation of MFIs 
Many have issued calls for more prudent regulation of MFIs (C-GAP, 2003). Non-profit MFIs 
are generally unregulated and not allowed to intermediate deposits. The main argument is 
that, since non-profit organisations do not have owners with monitoring incentives, they are 
weaker and riskier (Jansson et al., 2004). As a consequence, non-profit MFIs are prompted to 
transform themselves into shareholder banks in order to become regulated. However, 
Mersland and Strøm (2008) find that ownership type doesn’t matter for MFI performance, and 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) and Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) find that regulation 
has no direct effect upon MFI performance, and can only indirectly help increase scale and 
scope if the MFI is allowed to mobilise deposits (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007).  
 
Apex associations 
Moore and Stewart (1998) suggest that the use of collective self-regulation can help remedy 
agency costs in non-profits. National and voluntary associations of non-profits can improve 
managerial practices and organisational performance through self-policing. Since non-profit 
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organisations lack owners with strong monitoring incentives, Speckbacher (2008) argues that 
they are in special need of external reporting systems in order to reduce informational 
asymmetry between management and the various stakeholders. Such external reporting 
systems can be organised through auditing or self-regulation apex systems. 
 
Apex associations in the savings banks 
National apex associations were important in the early savings banks. The aim was typically 
threefold: first, to increase the overall power of negotiation with authorities and commercial 
competitors; second, to help the banks achieve economies of scale in service provisions (e.g. 
money transfer systems across the savings banks); and third, to act as a bank for the banks 
(Comin and Torres, 2003, Guinnane, 2002). In order to uphold membership in the association, 
minimum performance standards and self-regulation by the apex were common. Seibel (2003) 
points out that effective auditing carried out by the apex associations was an important 
mechanism in savings bank governance.  
 
Apex associations among MFIs 
Apex associations among MFIs are common (SEEPnetwork, 2005). They play a 
representative role and to some degree, they are also active in building the professional 
capacity of their members. In some networks, such as Red Financiera Rural in Ecuador and 
FINRURAL in Bolivia, they have installed a self-reporting monitoring system, though formal 
types of self-regulation are uncommon. The argument is that self-regulation cannot be 
prudent, as free riders are an obvious problem (C-GAP, 2003). Also, the networks of MFIs 
seldom serve their members with tangible services like wholesale lending, IT, or giro systems. 
As a consequence, the network becomes less important in the governance of the MFIs relative 
to the governance role of the savings bank associations. 
 140
 Competition 
Market competition is an external governance mechanism. In general, the more intense the 
competition, the less the owners need internal governance mechanisms (Schmidt, 1997, Hart, 
1983). Hansmann (1996) argues that, in markets with trustworthy regulation and deposit 
insurance, ownerless savings banks can compete with their commercial peers due to the 
disciplinary effect of market competition.   
 
Competition in savings banks  
In their early years, savings banks did not encounter much competition. People in urban areas 
did not trust the commercial banks, and local savings banks were generally alone in offering 
banking services in rural areas. However, gradually more savings banks were established, 
implying greater competition (Clemmensen, 1985), and more trustworthy regulation of 
commercial banks made them an alternative for poorer customers (Hansmann, 1989). 
Furthermore, since the mid-nineteenth century, member-based savings and credit cooperatives 
in many countries became important competitors of savings banks (Wolff, 1919, Hansmann, 
1996). Today, several observers argue that market competition is probably the number one 
mechanism enabling savings banks to continue as competitive organisations (Crespi et al., 
2004, Altunbas et al., 2001). 
 
Competition in today’s microfinance markets 
Many microfinance markets, especially those in rural locations, still have no formal financial 
service supplier (Robinson, 2001, Christen et al., 2004). Where MFIs exist, markets are often 
characterised by a severe lack of competition, and most clients have limited bargaining power 
vis-à-vis microfinance providers. However, there are exceptions. In Bolivia, where 
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competition has been increasing, the average annual yield has decreased during the last 
decade, from 50% in the leading  MFIs to just above 20% (Porteous, 2006).  
 
Demand deposits 
Most savings in banks are in accounts where the depositor can withdraw money on demand. 
Most theoretical models assume that the role of such demandable debt is to provide flexibility 
to the depositors (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Calomiris and Kahn (1991) offer an alternative 
explanation. They point out that allowing on-demand withdrawals implies a mismatch 
between the maturity of assets and liabilities. Such a financial structure is an optimal 
instrument for management control. In the event of bank trouble, depositors can immediately 
withdraw their money, causing the bank to fall. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) further point out 
that the disciplining mechanism works as long as the maturity of liabilities is less than the 
maturity of assets. Hollis and Sweetman (2007) tested Calomiris and Kahn’s (1991) theory on 
an historic case from Ireland. They found that institutions with more deposits were better at 
controlling expenses than those with less funding stemming from deposits.  
 
Demandable debt in savings banks 
Historians have long recognised the importance of demandable debt in disciplining managers 
of savings banks:  
‘if the saver had any dissatisfaction with the way the organization was being managed, 
he simply terminated his relationship by withdrawing his funds’ (Teck, 1968, p. 33).  
This is recognised by Hollis and Sweetman (1998), who point out that the importance of 
depositor monitoring on the sustainability of pro-poor banks should not be underestimated.  
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Savings in MFIs 
Non-profit MFIs are generally not allowed to intermediate deposits and consequently 
excluded from offering savings and funding their portfolios locally. Instead non-profit MFIs 
are funded by donations and medium-term international debt. Thus, since micro-credit is lent 
on short terms, the maturity of MFIs’ debt generally exceeds that of their assets. As a result, 
non-profit MFIs lack the disciplinary effect stemming from monitoring by depositors or debt 
holders. 
 
Local governments and communities 
From a stakeholder’s perspective, local governments and communities have important 
influence on the firm’s opportunities and behaviour.  
 
Local government and community influence on savings banks 
Savings banks have always been tied to and promoted by local communities in general, and 
by the local authorities in particular. In most countries, the local authorities helped organise 
the banks, and they have often provided some of the initial capital. In several local 
communities, the first savings banks merged with existing social services. In Spain, the banks 
joined forces with the Montes de Piedad, a relief fund for the poor (Sanchez, 2003). In 
Norway, several savings banks were merged with the community corn chambers intended for 
lean years (Rønning, 1972). At the same time, however, it was important for the banks to 
remain private entities, rather than public. Hence, the local authority was only one stakeholder 
alongside others, and attempts to tie the banks more closely to the public sector were punished 
by massive withdrawals of deposits (Martinez, 1998).  
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Another feature tying savings banks to local communities has been the banks’ funding of 
charity work and community projects (Sanchez, 2003). Institutionalising the partial return of 
profits to local communities has created a mechanism by which the local community helps to 
steward the banks. In addition, similar to dividends of for-profit firms, the funding of local 
projects reduces the bank’s free cash flow and management’s power, creating a governance 
mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Local government and community influence on MFIs today 
Today, few MFIs relate closely to the local authorities. The local authorities are more often 
seen as obstacles, creating difficulties in issuing permits or imposing taxes. In Peru, however, 
the Cajas Municipales represent an interesting exception. Over the last couple of decades, 
most of the Cajas have been successful MFIs (rating reports available at www.ratingfund.org).  
 
In their contact with local communities, except the member based organizations, most MFIs 
enter into a traditional bank-customer contractual relationship. The community is seldom a 
driving force behind the establishment of a non-profit MFI, nor is it invited to take a more 
active stake in its governance. However, there are exceptions. In the Bolivian non-profit MFI 
Diaconia FRIF, they have a conscious strategy of being part of the Indian Aymara 
community. The staff is largely Aymara, and several of them are involved in different 
Aymara organisations. According to Diaconia FRIF, the close relationship with the Aymara 
community has been instrumental in securing its success. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The differences in governance mechanisms between the historic savings banks and today’s 
non-profit MFIs invite deeper discussion. The previous section is summarised in Table 4. 
 144
 Table 4: The governance mechanisms of the historic savings banks and today’s non-profit MFIs 
Governance 
mechanism 
Historic savings banks Today’s non-profit MFIs 
Mission Pragmatic willingness to broaden the 
mission and include wealthier clients 
Mission drift debate still ongoing 
Boards Composed of upper-class people who 
also took part in the management. 
Gradually the board became less 
important 
Composed of upper-/middle-class 
professionals. Are considered important, 
but still most MFIs struggle to have 
active and competent boards 
Donors Took an active role in governance 
through board seats and personal 
reputation 
Monitoring efforts vary, but few donors 
are willing to take on an active 
governance role or sit on boards 
Regulation Either unregulated or operated under 
friendly regulatory regimes 
Unregulated because of non-profit 
ownership.  
Apex 
associations 
Were important in monitoring the banks 
and were a self-regulation mechanism. 
Also provided important services 
Important, but still much less than in the 
savings banks. Do not provide much 
self-regulation and tangible services 
Competition Low or no competition in the beginning, 
but today this is considered to be the 
number-one governance mechanism 
Still low competition, but increasing.  
Mismatch in 
liability/asset 
maturity 
Mismatch in liability/asset maturity 
important in disciplining the managers 
Non-existent due to the regulatory 
regimes 
Local 
communities 
and authorities 
Were important stakeholders in the 
banks and took active part in their 
governance 
The interaction with local authorities is 
generally low and the relationship with 
the communities is normally only of the 
customer-firm contract type 
 
One of the most puzzling questions is why the non-profit ownership structure of savings 
banks was seen as a guarantee for avoiding excessively risky behaviour, whereas it is 
considered inappropriate and excessively risky today (Jansson et al., 2004). Hansmann (1996) 
argues that since savings banks face a non-distribution constraint, they are generally more 
trustworthy than for-profit banks. Part of the answer is likely found in the fact that many non-
profit MFIs today have simply become ‘briefcases’ of their founders or managers. Another 
part may be that donors today are often too generous in their funding and too slack in their 
monitoring. The lack of a broader understanding of governance in general, and of non-profit 
ownership in particular, is also important.  
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It is a fact that the microfinance industry has many well-performing non-profit MFIs, 
demonstrating that non-profit ownership does not necessarily imply slack performance and 
donor dependence (Mersland and Strøm, 2008). However, since the current credit crunch is 
assumed to hit non-deposit taking MFIs relatively harder, it may become increasingly 
important to establish regulatory frameworks allowing well performing non-profit MFIs to 
intermediate deposits. Governance lessons from the savings banks may turn out to be 
particularly relevant. In this regard the recent initiatives in Bolivia are interesting, where non-
profit MFIs, members of the apex FINRURAL, are about to become regulated and allowed to 
intermediate deposits.  
 
The survival of savings banks can be attributed to pragmatism and their willingness to expand 
their missions. Several of the most commercial MFIs today will probably argue that this has 
also enabled their viability. Some, such as Procredit in Bolivia, provide loans above 
US$100,000 and are criticised by some for having left their original mission behind. 
However, Procredit states the opposite: most of their customers take very small loans, 
implying that they have expanded their mission but not abandoned it. However, few MFIs are 
as pragmatic as Procredit. The lesson from savings banks is that MFIs may need to become 
more pragmatic in order to survive over the longer term.  
 
This study reveals that there is clearly much more to governance than boards. Of course 
boards are important for MFIs today as they were in the initial stage of savings banks, but 
other mechanisms must substitute and reinforce boards in the disciplining of managers.  
Upper class board members in the savings banks were gradually replaced by groups with a 
more direct stake in the banks. Whether the inclusion of stakeholders like customers, 
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employers, local communities, donors and debt holders could enhance the performance of 
non-profit MFIs should be subject for research efforts. 
 
The Calomiris and Kahn’s (1991) model is important for understanding how agency costs in 
banking can be reduced.  This is particularly true when there is no takeover market (a non-
profit organisation cannot be taken over) and in an unregulated environment where the public 
has little confidence in the regulator’s willingness and ability to closely monitor the bank. 
However, it may sound too risky to introduce deposit intermediation in MFIs as a means to 
discipline managers through monitoring by depositors. And, of course, this would not be 
without any kind of pre-screening and monitoring of MFIs. However, microfinance customers 
operate in an informal economy, where they are already well acquainted with the need to 
monitor their deposits in informal rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs; 
(Bouman, 1995) or pre-payments made to the local construction shops. They are also well 
aware of the risks involved. For example, a study in Uganda revealed that 99% of the 
participants in ROSCAs had experienced losses (Wright and Mutesasira, 2001). Still, poor 
people prefer these schemes because the alternative of keeping cash at home is worse due to 
countless claims and needs (Rutherford, 2000). Thus, the alternative of allowing well-
performing non-profit MFIs to offer deposit services, and thereby introducing a new 
stakeholder to monitor operations, sounds like a solid bet. Furthermore, savings banks offer 
historical evidence that it might work. 
 
The lessons from savings banks present a message for donors. Their role is not only to donate, 
but to monitor. Donors generally avoid board seats in MFIs, probably due to the culture of the 
donors, who generally play the role of supporting local civil society rather than being part of 
it. However, MFIs are not advocacy organisations fighting for people’s rights. They are 
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banks, and those who provide them with funds should monitor their operations. Moreover, 
dedicated donors risk their reputation. Unfortunately, microfinance donors are organisations 
acting on behalf of back-donors and taxpayers, which makes fleeing from difficulties easier.   
 
Though Mersland and Strøm (Forthcoming) could not confirm the governance effect of 
competition, the evidence from savings banks suggests that competition does discipline 
managers. We expect that as markets mature increased competition will bring along customer 
benefits as experienced in Bolivia. Besides, policy makers and regulators should not forget the 
fact that multiple types of providers offer additional customer benefits compared to a single 
type of bank. Guinnane (2002) points out that historically diversity in the type of banks was 
important in generating a type of competition that fostered sound management. In addition, 
Normark (1996) points out that a combination of organisational types operating in the same 
market enhances competition and customer benefits. Thus, differences in missions and 
ownership structures stimulate competition and drive the actors towards different market 
segments (Mersland, Forthcoming). However, this requires a supportive regulatory 
environment across organisational types. 
 
An interesting aspect of the historic savings banks is their close relationship with local 
governments. Whether such a relationship would be positive in today’s politicised 
environment is uncertain. This should be a subject of further research effort, as should MFIs’ 
ties to local communities. Will the geographical expansion observed in many MFIs be 
beneficial in the long run? Would they be better off with a more integrated relationship with 
major stakeholders in a more limited local community where monitoring is more likely?  
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Apex bank associations were instrumental in both governing the savings banks through self-
regulatory efforts and improving economies of scope through service provision. Even today, 
spin-off companies, such as giro centrals or investment funds, are important apex structures, 
providing important services to savings banks. For the MFIs, starting off with better self-
regulation efforts, as they have done in Bolivia and Ecuador, could be a natural first step. 
Self-regulation cannot be a full substitute for prudent regulation by banking authorities, but it 
will be an extra mechanism playing a role in the overall governance system of MFIs. Besides 
this, independent MFIs will need to devise strategies to enable better economies of scope (e.g. 
IT systems). Thus, in the years to come, apex associations could probably play an increasingly 
important role, just as they did and continue to do for savings banks. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Microfinance is high on the public agenda. Better corporate governance of MFIs has been 
identified as a key to enhancing the viability of the industry. However, the recent literature on 
the subject has struggled to identify the corporate governance mechanisms influencing the 
performance of MFIs (Mersland and Strøm, Forthcoming, Hartarska, 2005). In line with 
recommendations provided in Mersland (Forthcoming), this paper uses a historical parallel 
found in savings banks to present corporate governance lessons for today’s MFIs. There are 
several similarities between nineteenth century savings banks and today’s non-profit MFIs. 
Both legally and economically, due to their non-profit status and non-distribution constraints, 
they are similar types of organisations. The corporate governance mechanisms affecting one 
type of organisation may therefore affect the other. Guided by stakeholder and agency 
theories, this paper reviews the historical literature on the subject to identify the important 
governance mechanisms that allowed savings banks to survive, and it analyses whether MFIs, 
particularly non-profit MFIs, can learn something from their example.  
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 The findings indicate that monitoring by bank associations, depositors, donors, and local 
communities were important in disciplining managers and securing the survival of savings 
banks. External governance in the form of public regulation was generally absent, while 
product market competition became an increasingly major factor in disciplining the managers. 
The willingness to expand their mission to serve wealthier customers alongside the poor 
helped the banks to become financially viable. 
 
This paper demonstrates that historical studies can lend governance lessons today. The 
findings could prompt a revision in the thought surrounding microfinance governance, which 
stresses for-profit ownership, regulation, and traditional vertical board control. The lessons 
from savings banks indicate that a broader and more stakeholder-based understanding of 
corporate governance is necessary. Stakeholders like depositors, donors, local communities, 
and bank associations can together provide a monitoring system that can enhance the long-
term survival of MFIs. The findings also indicate that the need to transform ownership and 
limit regulation to for-profit MFIs could be mitigated, and a pragmatic attitude toward 
financial objectives may improve the financial viability of the MFIs.  
 
The importance placed on microfinance as a development instrument, combined with the 
increasing inflow of capital to the industry, indicate a need to better understand governance 
systems for MFIs. Further studies are needed. In particular, future research could consider 
how a combination of organisational types enhances competition in the microfinance market 
and how competition affects MFIs’ performance. Studies are also needed on how donor 
monitoring, apex organizations, and mismatches in the maturity of liabilities and assets 
influence management behaviour and MFI performance. A historical study, similar to this, on 
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how member based cooperative MFIs can learn governance lessons from their nineteenth 
century cooperative peers (Wolff, 1919), is also recommended.  
 
 151
REFERENCES 
ADAMS, D. W. & FITCHETT, D. A. (1992) Informal finance in low-income countries. 
ADAMS, R. B. & MEHRAN, H. (2003) Is corporate governance different for bank holding 
companies? Economic Policy Review 9, 123-142. 
ALTUNBAS, Y., EVANS, L. & MOLYNEUX, P. (2001) Bank Ownership and Efficiency. 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 33, 926-954. 
BOUMAN, F. A. J. (1995) ROSCA: On the origin of the species. Savings and Development, 
19, 117-147. 
C-GAP (2003) Guiding principles on regulation and supervision of microfinance. 
Microfinance Consensus Guidelines  
C-GAP (2006) Good practice guidelines for funders of microfinance  Washington, C-GAP. 
CALOMIRIS, C. W. & KAHN, C. M. (1991) The role of demandable debt in structuring 
optimal banking arrangements. The American Economic Review 81, 497-513. 
CAPRIO, G. & VITTAS, D. (1997) Financial history: Lessons of the past for reformers of the 
present. IN CAPRIO, G. & VITTAS, D. (Eds.) Reforming financial systems - 
Historical implications for policy. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. 
CHRISTEN, R. P., ROSENBERG, R. & JAYADEVA, V. (2004) Financial Institutions with a 
"Double Bottom Line": Implications for the future of Microfinance. Occasional Paper 
Washington, C-GAP. 
CLEMMENSEN, N. (1985) Sparekassebevægelsen i Danmark 1810-1914, København, 
Jurist- og Økonomforbundets forlag. 
COMIN, F. & TORRES, E. (2003) Una historia urgente de la confederacion Española de 
cajas de ahorro. Papeles de economia española, 97, 246-284. 
CRESPI, R., GARCIA-CESTONA, M. A. & SALAS, V. (2004) Governance mechanisms in 
Spanish Banks. Does Ownership matter? Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 2311-
2330. 
CSFI (2008) Microfinance banana skins - Risk in a booming industry. IN HILTON, A. (Ed. 
Banking banana skins report. New York, Centre for the study of financial innovation. 
DICHTER, T. W. & HARPER, M. (Eds.) (2007) What's wrong with Microfinance, Essex, 
England, Practical Action Publishing. 
EGGE, Å. (1972) Trekk ved sparebankvesenet og sparebanklovgivningen i slutten av forrige 
århundre, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. 
FAMA, E. F. & JENSEN, M. C. (1983) Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of 
Law and Economics 26, 301-327. 
FISHLOW, A. (1961) The Trustee Savings Banks, 1817-1861. The journal of Economic 
History 21, 26-40. 
FREEMAN, R. E. (1984) Strategic management: A stakeholder approach, Boston, Pitman. 
FREIXAS, X. & ROCHET, J.-C. (1997) Microeconomics of banking, London, MIT Press. 
FÄLTING, L., LILJEFROST, E. & PETERSON, T. (2006) The microfinance revolution 
revisited: Experiences from the savings banks history in Sweden. European Dialogue, 
36. 
GLAESER, E. L. (2002) The Governance of Not-For-Profit Firms. 
http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&an=0715210&loginpage=l
ogin.asp National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers: 8921. 
GUINNANE, T. W. (2002) Delegated Monitors, Large and Small: Germany's Banking 
System, 1800-1914. Journal of economic Literature XL, 73-124. 
HANDY, F. (1995) Reputation as collateral: AN economic analysis of the role of trustees of 
nonprofits. Nonprofit and Voluntary sector Quarterly, 24, 293-305. 
 152
HANSEN, P. H. (2001) Regulation in Denmark from 1880 to World war two: Public interests 
and private interests. Business History, 43, 43-68. 
HANSMANN, H. (1989) The economic role of commercial nonprofits: The ecolution of the 
U.S. savings banks industry. IN ANHEIER, H. & SEIBEL, W. (Eds.) The Third 
Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations De Gruyter. 
HANSMANN, H. (1996) The ownership of enterprise, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
HART, O. (1983) The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell journal of economics, 
14, 366-382. 
HARTARSKA, V. (2005) Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. World Development 
33, 1627-1643. 
HARTARSKA, V. & NADOLNYAK, D. (2007) Do regulated microfinance institutuions 
acrhive better sustainability and outreach? Cross-country evidence. Applied 
Economics, 39, 1-16. 
HELMS, B. (2006) Access for All, Washington DC, CGAP. 
HOLLIS, A. & SWEETMAN, A. (1998) Microcredit: What Can we Learn from the Past? 
World Development 26, 1875-1891. 
HOLLIS, A. & SWEETMAN, A. (2004) Microfinance and Famine: The Irish Loan Funds 
during the Great Famine. World Development 32, 1509-1523. 
HOLLIS, A. & SWEETMAN, A. (2007) The role of local depositors in controlling expenses 
in small-scale financial intermediation: An empirical analysis. Economica, 74, 713-
735. 
HORNE, H. O. (1947) A history of savings banks, London, Oxford University Press. 
HULME, D. (2000) Is microdept good for poor people? A note on the dark side of 
microfinance. Small Enterprise development 11, 26-28. 
JANSSON, T., ROSALES, R. & WESTLEY, G. (2004) Principles and Practices for 
Regulating and Supervising Microfinance. . Washington, D.C., Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
JENSEN, M. C. & MECKLING, W. H. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
LABIE, M. (2001) Corporate governance in microfinance organizations: a long and winding 
road. Management Decision 39, 296-301. 
LEDGERWOOD, J. & WHITE, V. (2006) Transforming Microfinance Institutions, 
Washington, The World Bank and The MicroFinance Network. 
MARTINEZ, M. T. (1998) La creacion de las cajas de ahorros. Motivacones, Protagonistas y 
Evolucion Numerica. Papeles de economia española 74-75. 
MERSLAND, R. (Forthcoming) The cost of ownership in microfinance organizations. World 
Development. 
MERSLAND, R. & STRØM, R. Ø. (2008) Performance and trade-offs in microfinance 
institutions - Does ownership matter? Journal of International Development, 20, 598-
612. 
MERSLAND, R. & STRØM, R. Ø. (Forthcoming) Performance and governance in 
microfinance institutions. Journal of Banking and Finance. 
MICROBANKING-BULLETIN (2007) Issue No. 15. Washington, MIX. 
MITCHELL, R. K., AGLE, B. R. & WOOD, D. J. (1997) Toward a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. 
Academy of Management Review 22, 853-886. 
MOORE, M. & STEWART, S. (1998) Corporate governance of NGOs? Development in 
Practice, 8, 335-342. 
 153
 154
MORDUCH, J. (2000) The Microfinance Schism. World Development 28, 617-629. 
NORMARK, P. (1996) A role for cooperatives in the market economy. Annals of Public & 
Cooperative Economics 67, 429-439. 
OGRADA, C. (2003) Savings banks as an institutional import: the case of nineteenth-century 
Ireland. Financial History Review 10, 31-55. 
OTERO, M. & CHU, M. (2002) Governance and Ownership of Microfinance Institutions. IN 
DRAKE, D. & RHYNE, E. (Eds.) The Commercialization of Microfinance 
Bloomfield, Kumarian Press. 
PAMPILLON, F. (2003) Los modelos historicos europeos de cajas de ahorros. Papeles de 
economia española 97, 62-79. 
POHL, H. (2003) El desarrollo de las cajas de ahorros en Alemania hasta la tercera decada del 
siglo XIX. Papeles de economia española 97, 80-92. 
PORTEOUS, D. (2006) Competition and Microcredit Interest Rates. Focus Note Washington, 
CGAP. 
REILLE, X. & FOSTER, S. (2008) Foreign Capital Investment in Microfinance. Focus Note. 
Washington, C-GAP. 
ROBINSON, M. S. (2001) The Microfinance Revolution, Washington, The World Bank / 
Open Society Institute. 
ROCK, R., OTERO, M. & SALTZMAN, S. (1998) Principles and Practices of Microfinance 
Governance. Microenterprise Best Practices DAI / USAID. 
RUTHERFORD, S. (2000) The poor and their money, Dehli, Oxford University Press. 
RØNNING, B. R. (1972) Norsk Sparebankvesen inntil 1850, Oslo, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. 
SANCHEZ, P. F. (2003) El origen de la obra benefica de las cajas de ahorros. Papeles de 
economia española, 97, 230-243. 
SCHMIDT, K. M. (1997) Mangerial incentives and product market competition. Review of 
Economic Studies, 64, 191-213. 
SEEPNETWORK (2005) Global directory of regional and country-level microfinance 
networks. Washington, The SEEP network. 
SEIBEL, H. D. (2003) History matters in microfinance. Small Enterprise Development 14, 
10-12. 
SPECKBACHER, G. (2008) Nonprofit versus corporate governance: An economic approach. 
Nonprofit management and leadership, 18, 295-320. 
TECK, A. (1968) Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan Associations: Aspects of 
Growth, New York, Columbia University Press. 
THOMSEN, S. (2008) An introduction to Corporate Governance, Copenhagen, DJØF 
Publishing. 
TUCKER, D. M. (1991) The decline of thrift in America - Our cultural shift from saving to 
spending, Praeger, New York. 
VARIAN, H. (1990) Monitoring agents with other agents. Journal of institutional and 
theoretical economics, 46, 153-174. 
VITTAS, D. (1997) Thrift deposit insitutions in Europe and the United States. IN GERARD 
CAPRIO, J. A. D. V. (Ed.) Reforming financial systems - Historical implications for 
policy. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. 
WOLFF, H. W. (1919) People's Banks, fourth edition, London, P.S. King & Son, Ltd. . 
WRIGHT, G. A. N. & MUTESASIRA, L. (2001) The relative risks to the savings of poor 
people. . Nairobi, Kenya, MicroSave. 
 
 
